Category Archives: causes of the crisis

Investor End Games: All Is Not Well in the Garden

Posted on August 29, 2012 by igradman

“As long as the roots are not severed, all is well.  And all will be well in the garden.” – Chance the Gardener, Being There (1979) With Judge Barbara Kapnick announcing earlier this month that the approval hearing in Bank … Continue reading →

Posted in AIG, allocation of loss, ASF, Attorneys General, Bank of New York, banks, BlackRock, Bloomberg, BofA, bondholder actions, causes of the crisis, conflicts of interest, consitutionality, contract rights, costs of the crisis, Countrywide, damages, Deutsche Bank, discovery, eminent domain, fiduciary duties, foreclosure crisis, fraud, global settlement, Grais and Ellsworth, impact of the crisis, incentives, investors, irresponsible lending, Judge Barbara Kapnick, Judge Eileen Bransten, junior liens, Kathy Patrick, lawsuits, lenders, lending guidelines, liabilities, LIBOR manipulation, liquidity, litigation, litigation costs, lobbying, MBIA, MBS, misrespresentation, monoline actions, monolines, mortgage fraud, mortgage insurers, mortgage market, negative equity, Neil Barofsky, private label MBS, procedural hurdles, putbacks, recession, rep and warranty, repurchase, Residential Capital, responsibility, restructuring, RMBS, securities, securitization, sellers and sponsors, settlements, standing, statistical sampling, statutes of limitations, successor liability, summary judgment, The Subprime Shakeout, too big to fail, toxic assets, Treasury, Trustees, underwriting guidelines, underwriting practices, US Bank, vicarious liability, waiver of rights to sue, Wall St., Walnut Place, Way Too Big to Fail, Wells Fargo, William Frey | 2 Comments

Why Mortgage Loan Servicers Behave as They Do

Posted on March 5, 2012 by igradman

Editor’s Note: It seems that we can’t go three months without hearing about yet another species of misconduct by mortgage servicers that shifts losses onto the lienholders they are supposed to protect.  We’ve read reports about force-placed insurance, inflated appraisal … Continue reading →

Posted in accounting fraud, allocation of loss, appraisals, auditing, banks, broader credit crisis, causes of the crisis, conflicts of interest, contract rights, costs of the crisis, firing servicers, foreclosure crisis, improper documentation, incentives, investigations, junior liens, lending guidelines, loan modifications, MBIA, MBS, monolines, mortgage fraud, private label MBS, RMBS, robo-signers, securitization, servicer defaults, servicers, settlements, subprime, underwriting guidelines, underwriting practices, Way Too Big to Fail | 4 Comments

MBIA Celebrates Bransten Decision on Loss Causation; Bondholders Still Looking for Guidance

Posted on January 9, 2012 by igradman

As loyal readers will recall, I laid it on the line a few weeks back and predicted that MBIA would win its loss causation argument against Countrywide/BofA, making the nation’s largest bank wish it had settled this bellwether piece of … Continue reading →

Posted in appeals, banks, BofA, bondholder actions, broader credit crisis, causes of the crisis, contract rights, damages, investors, Judge Jed Rakoff, Judicial Opinions, lawsuits, liabilities, litigation, loss causation, MBIA, MBS, misrespresentation, monoline actions, monolines, pooling agreements, private label MBS, putbacks, rep and warranty, repurchase, rescission, RMBS, securitization, statistical sampling, The Subprime Shakeout | 5 Comments

MBS Litigation Update: Why BofA Will Lose the Loss Causation Argument and Wish It Had Settled with MBIA

Posted on November 22, 2011 by igradman

With all eyes in the mortgage litigation world glued to the pending decision on Partial Summary Judgment in MBIA v. Countrywide, et al., commentators are beginning to speculate that a settlement may be in the offing between the two MBS … Continue reading →

Posted in Alison Frankel, allocation of loss, Bank of New York, banks, BofA, branch hill capital, causes of the crisis, Countrywide, irresponsible lending, lawsuits, lenders, lending guidelines, liabilities, litigation, loss causation, MBIA, MBS, misrespresentation, motions to dismiss, Philippe Selendy, pooling agreements, private label MBS, putbacks, quinn emanuel, rep and warranty, repurchase, RMBS, securitization, statistical sampling, Uncategorized, underwriting practices | 10 Comments

Release of “Way Too Big to Fail” Simply Opening Salvo in Efforts to Reform Mortgage Finance

Posted on November 7, 2011 by igradman

It’s tempting when you have an enormous task before you to focus all of your attention on completing that task while blocking out any thoughts of what comes next.  For me, that enormous task has been the publication of a … Continue reading →

Posted in allocation of loss, appeals, Bank of New York, banks, BofA, bondholder actions, causes of the crisis, contract rights, Countrywide, discovery, FHFA, global settlement, investors, irresponsible lending, lawsuits, liabilities, litigation, lobbying, loss causation, MBIA, monoline actions, mortgage market, pooling agreements, private label MBS, putbacks, regulation, Regulators, remand, repurchase, RMBS, securitization, settlements, statistical sampling, successor liability, The Subprime Shakeout, Uncategorized, Way Too Big to Fail, William Frey | 1 Comment