Strange Bedfellows: Barney Frank’s Falling Out With Wall Street Leaves Him Aligned With Former Nemesis

I have seen some strange things during my time covering the mortgage crisis, but this one may beat them all.

On August 20, 2010, representative Barney Frank (D-MA) sent a letter to Barack Obama, urging the President to appoint a permanent head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) who would aggressively pursue legal claims against the private companies that caused Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (and thus, taxpayers) to suffer losses, namely, the lenders who originated subprime and Alt-A mortgages during the boom years (roughly 2005 to early 2008). Frank’s letter directly endorses a similar letter sent by representative Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) and the House Financial Services Committee on August 13, 2010, which also urged Obama to appoint an FHFA director to “vigorously pursue all legal claims for losses” sustained by Fannie and Freddie and identified specific legal action the FHFA has taken and should continue to take to recover these losses. Kanjorski’s letter went into greater detail, indentifying the pursuit of mortgage repurchases for rep and warranty violations, the issues private investors had experienced in accessing loan files, the FHFA subpoenas designed to acquire those loan files, and the servicer conflicts of interest that had contributed to their obduracy.

If my readers will recall, some of these same officials had previously taken positions that were vehemently and diametrically opposed to encouraging the pursuit of legal rights against servicers (often affiliates of the same entities that originated these defective loans), and in fact had supported measures that helped protect servicers from legal liability. For example, in October of 2008, Frank was among the congressional signatories on a letter sent to Bill Frey of Greenwich Financial Services, which has filed a lawsuit against Countrywide to prevent the servicer from modifying mortgages without bondholder approval, as required by contract. Frey had long been a vocal bondholder advocate who had publicized the various servicer conflicts of interest and breaches of their obligations to service mortgages in the best interests of bondholders. Frank’s October 2008 letter accused Frey of interfering with Washington’s attempts to avoid foreclosures by encouraging loan modifications, and “invited” Frey to testify before Congress to explain himself. Frey wrote a letter in response, and ended up showing up in Washington to testify, but was never called to the stand.

In another example, both Kanjorski and Frank were sponsors of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, a bill passed in 2009 with the ostensible goal of reducing foreclosures, but which attempted to do so by incentivizing servicers to modify mortgages with cash and legal immunity, courtesy of a Servicer Safe Harbor (introduced by Kanjorski and Michael Castle (R-DE)). This Safe Harbor purported to nullify any contractual provisions that required servicers to buy-back the loans that they modified. Soon after, Frey wrote a scathing Op-Ed piece in the Washington Times explaining why servicer conflicts of interest would doom any effort to make them the arbiters of loan modifications. I have also written several articles identifying the folly of this legislation (see examples from the Subprime Shakeout here, here and here, and a longer article on the background and constitutionality of this legislation here) and pointing out how Kanjorski was the second-largest recipient of Countrywide campaign contributions since 1989. It is also interesting to note that Frank’s second-largest donor during the 2008 election cycle was Bank of America, and that Frank’s top 20 donors included Royal Bank of Scotland (No. 4), JPMorgan Chase (tied at No. 11), Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley (all tied at No. 17).

Frank later began to reverse course in July 2009, issuing a public letter urging regulators to investigate servicer conflicts of interest, including those resulting from their holdings of second lien loans. This indicated that Frank was beginning to realize that it wasn’t bondholders who were truly preventing distressed loans from being modified, but the very same banks that had originated the defective loans in the first place.

Over the next year, it became apparent that Frank wasn’t just talking out of both sides of his mouth, but that he really had changed positions on this issue. This could have been a result of a change in conscience, but more than likely, it was a result of a change in the political landscape and the fact that Frank has a legitimate fight on his hands to achieve reelection in 2010. Tellingly, none of Frank’s former top-20 Wall Street donors from 2008 or any major banks are anywhere to be found in Frank’s list of top donors for the 2010 election cycle.

In July 2010, the Frank-Dodd Financial Reform Bill was signed into law, consisting of 2,000 pages of legislation aimed at halting abusive practices in the mortgage industry and preventing another financial crisis, but which left many of the specifics of such reform for regulators to fill in over the next 6 to 18 months. Frank was a major force behind the bill, as its name suggests, and, in a revealing interview with Charlie Rose, Frank hailed the bill as a victory over Wall Street and discussed the challenges of taking on the banks.

For example, at the 12:20 point in the interview, Frank states that banks were most afraid of (and put most of their guns into opposing) the new consumer protection bureau because they make most of their money on credit card overdraft charges and late fees, rather than loans.  Frank then says, “And [the banks] lost.”  That’s when it gets really interesting, as Frank says, “they told me not even to try because the banks always win… They didn’t win today.”

At the 19:35 point, Frank makes another revealing comment.  He begins by saying, “public opinion is powerful.”  He notes that last year’s bill (probably referring to the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act) was not as powerful as this bill because the media was more focused on health care, “so the big interests won more of the fights than I wanted them to or than I wish they did….” Though it’s easy to be skeptical of comments such as this, Frank’s almost wistful tone in making this statement (watch the video and see if you disagree) leaves the indelible image of a man who has been misled by those he trusted.

Thus, I had some inclination of a falling out between Wall Street and Frank, but I must say I was surprised by Frank’s recent letter regarding the FHFA. It isn’t just that he is now taking a more strident stand against the banks that supported him during the last election cycle, but that, by advocating mortgage repurchases, Frank has now aligned himself (perhaps unwittingly) with the former target of his wrath, Bill Frey.

On September 23, 2010, it was revealed that Frey was involved in efforts by the Investor Syndicate to do just what Frank’s letter to the President urges – pursue legal claims against residential mortgage originators for defective underwriting and breaches of reps and warranties. With their interests now so closely aligned, maybe Frank should recommend that the President appoint Frey as the head of the FHFA. After all, Frey was way out in front of this issue and has the experience to do the job. It’s safe to say that such a development wouldn’t be any stranger than the recent vicissitudes in Frank’s relationship with Wall Street.

Posted in Barack Obama, Barney Frank (D-MA), BofA, campaign finance, FHFA, Greenwich Financial Services, Investor Syndicate, Paul Kanjorski, rep and warranty, repurchase, servicers, William Frey | 2 Comments

Inside Mortgage Finance Sees Private Label Rep and Warranty Claims Increasing

The following story appeared in the September 3, 2010 issue of Inside Nonconforming Markets, a biweekly newsletter focusing on news and data on non-agency mortgages.  This story reflects the growing awareness in the marketplace of the undisclosed mortgage repurchase liabilities facing this nation’s largest financial institutions.  Though Barclays makes a statement in this story that buybacks peaked in 2007, note that the mortgages that made up those repurchases were home equity lines of credit, second liens and first lien deals wrapped by mortgage insurers.  This shows that the banks have not even begun to face the bulk of first lien loan-level repurchase requests from private investors.  As the Investor Syndicate continues to organize and move forward, that is certain to change…
Non-Agency Rep/Warrant Claims Likely to Increase
Loan originators and underwriters of non-agency mortgage-backed securities face increasing repurchase requests due to widespread breaches of representations and warranties, according to industry analysts. While the claims will likely rise, the eventual impact on the non-agency mortgage market remains unclear.
Isaac Gradman, an attorney with Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin in San Francisco, estimates that 50 percent to 80 percent of the mortgages in non-agency MBS are missing documents or are in a direct breach of rep and warrant guidelines. Gradman and his firm represent PMI Mortgage Insurance Co., which recently alleged misrepresentations by WMC Mortgage on a $1 billion subprime MBS pool.
Non-agency MBS repurchase requests based on rep and warrant violations are currently low because MBS investors have had difficulties obtaining loan files from trustees. However, lawsuits by mortgage insurers and some Federal Home Loan Banks, as well as separate pending actions by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Federal Reserve and an investor consortium could trigger a rush of non-agency repurchase requests.
While obtaining and analyzing loan files can be costly for non-agency MBS investors, Gradman predicted that investors are going to find that it is worth the up-front cost. “The cost is very small compared to the amount you can recover,” he said.
Analysts at Compass Point Research and Trading estimate that the total liability for rescission requests on subprime MBS is $80.3 billion, with a worst-case estimate of $89.3 billion in liability for the sector and a best-case estimate of $46.6 billion. The research firm’s estimate of the total liability for rescission requests on Alt A MBS is $67.9 billion, with a $99.1 billion worst-case estimate and a $13.4 billion best-case estimate.
Analysts at Barclays Capital agree that non-agency buybacks will likely increase going forward but they suggest buybacks will still be limited due to the numerous obstacles non-agency MBS investors face when seeking buybacks. “Bank losses due to rep and warranty related repurchases should also be more manageable than what many investors might be assuming,” Barclays said.
The quarterly volume of non-agency MBS repurchases has been between $60 million and $100 million since the beginning of 2009, according to Barclays. The repurchases have been dominated by home-equity lines of credit, second liens and by first lien deals wrapped by mortgage insurers.
Non-agency MBS buybacks on a quarterly basis peaked at about $2.75 billion in the first quarter of 2007, according to Barclays. Buybacks at the time were tied to early-payment defaults.
HELOCs and second lien deals account for about 42 percent of the $550 million in non-agency MBS repurchases from the beginning of 2009 through the second quarter of 2010, despite forming only about 15 percent of the delinquent loans, according to Barclays.
Alt A deals accounted for another 35 percent of the repurchases during the period. Barclays said HELOCs and Alt A mortgages likely dominated non-agency repurchases because they were the deals most likely to have mortgage insurance.
Outlook Cloudy
With the majority of subprime and Alt A originators out of business, most rep and warrant activity has focused on non-agency MBS underwriters. Those pursuing repurchase requests generally claim that securitization underwriters misrepresented the profile of loan standards within a security’s initial prospectus.
Gradman said rep and warrant violations were flagrant during the subprime boom. “Once the loan files are received, there’s not going to be a lot of debate,” he said.
He predicted that banks will seriously consider settling with non-agency MBS investors instead of risking even larger losses by fighting the claims in court. Gradman said the few settlements that have already been reached are confidential.
Gradman noted that compensating factors could help originators and MBS underwriters defend against rep and warrant claims, but he said such factors were rarely documented by lenders. Recouping buyback losses from borrowers could also be difficult.
Gradman said borrowers often were not complicit in mortgage fraud and borrowers are unlikely to pay anything material. “It’s hard to prove that the originator did not participate in the fraud,” he said.
Banks have also argued that rep and warrant breaches are minimal and that non-agency MBS investors’ losses have been due to the mortgage crisis in general.
However, judicial momentum could be shifting in favor of non-agency MBS investors. “There is a dawning of understanding in a lot of courts across the country that these losses were not due only to a drop in home prices,” Gradman said.
Meanwhile, Barclays warns that rep and warrant buybacks will make lenders even more cautious in originating new non-agency mortgages. ►

Reprinted with permission of Inside Mortgage Finance Publications, Inc. from Inside Nonconforming Markets, September 3, 2010   www.imfpubs.com

Posted in Federal Home Loan Banks, FHFA, judicial momentum, liabilities, loan files, private label MBS, rep and warranty, repurchase | 1 Comment

Recording Of Compass Point Mortgage Repurchase Call Available

We had a great turnout for the Compass Point call today on mortgage repurchase liability and I thought the questions and remarks of the various participants were interesting and informative.  For those of you who missed the call, you can access a recording by downloading the .wav file at http://audio3.confpro.com and use reference #2528811.  You can also dial 888.284.7564 and use reference #252811 to hear a replay of the call.

Thanks to Jason Stewart, Mike Turner and Chris Gamaitoni for putting this call together, having me on as the featured guest, and raising awareness about this important issue.  As more investors and media outlets become aware of the significant outstanding mortgage repurchase liability facing many of the largest banks, we can expect to see more of the owners of mortgage backed securities coming forward to enforce their rights and banks beginning to acknowledge this potential liability in their loss reserves.  All this points to an increase in mortgage buy back litigation on the horizon, and an eventual transfer of wealth from the banks that originated and securitized massive numbers of defective loans to the pension funds, mutual funds, and other ordinary investors who bought an interest in those loans in reliance on the banks’ representations regarding underwriting quality.


Keep an eye out for an article later this week on how many of the banks’ former friends in Washington have finally woken up to this issue, and changed their tunes, accordingly…

Posted in Compass Point, irresponsible lending, liabilities, litigation, public perceptions, rep and warranty, repurchase, reserve reporting | 3 Comments

Compass Point To Hold Call Addressing Mortgage Repurchase Risks

Compass Point Research & Trading, a registered broker/dealer and one of the leading financial research firms investigating Alt-A and subprime mortgage backed securities (MBS), will be hosting a conference call to discuss mortgage repurchase risks.  The call will be held on Tuesday, August 31, 2010 at 1:00 P.M. Eastern and will be open to the public by using the following call-in number: 1-866-812-6491.  Jason Stewart, the Managing Director of Compass Point, will moderate the call and I have been invited to be the featured guest.  The plan is to have some prepared remarks, and then open up the floor to questions.   I would welcome the participation of any of my readers.

Compass Point issued a report on August 17, 2010 that did a great job of attempting to quantify the potential liability that banks are facing from private-label mortgage repurchase obligations.  The report cites to the Subprime Shakeout and discusses the potential impact of the FHLB lawsuits (prior articles here and here), the investor syndicate, the FHFA subpoenas, the mortgage insurance lawsuits against Countrywide in New York State Court, the Greenwich Financial lawsuit against Countrywide, and the recent involvement of the New York Fed in enforcing repurchase obligations.  The report recognizes that the real issue is access to loan files and that the investor syndicate may have amassed enough voting rights to compel servicers to turn these files over in a large number of trusts.  In short, Compass Point seems to have a firm understanding of the key issues and developments with respect to mortgage repurchase liability.

What’s the bottom line?  While Compass Point’s report provides best and worst case scenarios, it also takes a position as to the ultimate liability that the largest banks will face in connection with their origination of subprime and Alt-A mortgages during the 2005-2007 timeframe.  While these loss estimates may be conservative (they assume investors will only attempt to put back roughly 50% of loans, whereas from my experience, this number could be more like 75-80%), they are nonetheless significant: liability for Alt-A and subprime originations combined is estimated at $35.2 billion for Bank of America (based on the acquisition of Countrywide and Merrill Lynch) and $23.9 billion for JP Morgan (based on the acquisition of Bear Stearns).  The report goes on to note that there are serious questions over whether banks have adequately reserved for these losses, echoing the letter sent to JP Morgan this year by the SEC.

I am very much looking forward to this call on Tuesday, and hope that many of you will join.

Posted in BofA, Compass Point, Federal Home Loan Banks, Federal Reserve, FHFA, JPMorgan, liabilities, loan files, loss estimates, private label MBS, repurchase, research, reserve reporting | 4 Comments

New York Fed Throws Weight Behind Mortgage Buy Backs

As reported in Bloomberg, the Federal Bank of New York has announced that it is involved in “multiple efforts” to exercise its rights with respect to its holdings in faulty mortgages an other assets acquired through the bailouts of Bear Stearns and AIG.  The Fed holds nearly $70 billion in assets such as mortgage backed securities and collateralized debt obligations that were placed in holding companies established during the rescue of Bear and AIG in 2008.  BlackRock, which has led the charge among investors to force banks to absorb losses, is purportedly advising the Fed on its rights with respect to its holdings.  The Fed joins Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac among the federal regulators that have recently turned their attention to putting back defective loans to the banks that originated them, which in the Fed’s case includes Countrywide/BofA, Goldman Sachs, UBS and defunct lender New Century Financial.

Just last month, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees Freddie and Fannie, issued 64 subpoenas to loan servicers and securitization trustees seeking loan files underlying the securities bought by the GSEs. The GSEs reportedly held nearly $255 billion of mortgage related securities as of the end of May 2010.

As discussed in prior posts, loan originators generally sold loans into securitizations with extensive representations and warranties regarding underwriting methodology and compliance with strict guidelines designed to ensure the loan value and the borrower’s ability to pay were supported.  Where loan files underlying the mortgages in securitization reveal that those guidelines or underwriting methodologies were not followed, lenders have contractual obligations to repurchase the loans or substitute the loans with comparable performing mortgages. According to the Bloomberg article, violations of these reps and warranties cost the Big Four U.S. lenders about $5 billion last year, but that number is expected to skyrocket as more regulators and private investors jump on the put-back bandwagon.  These prospective losses have attracted the attention of the SEC, which issued a demand to JP Morgan in January for more disclosure on its repurchase liabilities.

Indeed, the holdings of the New York Fed and the GSEs in mortgage related securities constitute only a fraction of the $1.5 trillion private label bond market, and just over half of the pool represented by the Investor Syndicate, first introduced here and hereThe Syndicate fired its first warning shot across the bows of securitization trustees and servicers last month, and is expected to begin identifying specific breaches and enforcing its rights to documents and repurchases this month.  Various estimates from loan auditors have placed the percentage of deficient loans in 2005 to 2007 vintage private label securitizations anywhere from 40 to 90 percent (MBIA alleges in its complaint against Countrywide and BofA in Los Angeles County Court that it found deficiencies in 91% of the loans it reviewed in a particular sample).  If you do the math, that’s a massive amount of potential liability for the surviving subprime-era lenders.

The recent flurry of activity by federal regulators provides perfect political cover for the Syndicate and should grease the wheels of document production and lender cooperation.  It’s one thing to resist the efforts of a private consortium representing over one-third of the private label bond market.   It’s another to refuse compliance with the federal government.

In short, the concerted resistance to turning over loan files and servicing loans in accordance with bondholder wishes displayed by banks over the last year should begin to erode as banks realize that they can stall no longer.  Investors have clear rights to the documents underlying their investments, and to mortgage buy-backs where those documents reveal loan quality was deficient.  The problem up to now has been enforcing those rights.

Because the inherent strategy of a mortgage securitization was to spread out mortgage risk among a large pool of investors, no one private investor had the authority (or the incentive) to take action against the banks and force repurchases.  Generally, at least 25% of the asset class is required to petition the Trustee, and 50% is required to have a credible threat of firing the Trustee if it does not respond to entreaties for action.  Moreover, any benefit of a mortgage put-back would be dispersed among the entire pool of securities, or even several pools of securities, so the benefit to any one investor would be diffuse and freerider problems would abound.

Now that investors have organized, and have sufficient numbers and the proper incentives to take action, and now that federal regulators have joined the fray, I see the banks changing their strategy from one of postponing and delaying losses, to one of trying to resolve their repurchase liabilities through settlement.  Whether that’s a global settlement or a number of individual deals remains to be seen, but what is certain is that the major banks face a slew of lawsuits and a hefty repurchase tab if they don’t acknowledge their repurchase risk and take a seat at the negotiating table.

Posted in AIG, Bear Stearns, BlackRock, CDOs, Fannie Mae, Federal Reserve, Freddie Mac, freeriders, global settlement, incentives, Investor Syndicate, loan files, MBS, rep and warranty, repurchase, SEC | 1 Comment