BofA and Countrywide Appeal Order Allowing MBIA Vicarious Liability Claim To Proceed

In a move that could have dramatic consequences for the financial stability of Bank of America (BofA), a New York state court judge has held that monoline bond insurer MBIA can go forward with claims that BofA be held vicariously liable for claims against its subsidiary, Countrywide.  BofA has already filed an appeal of the Order, issued by Judge Eileen Bransten in New York State Supreme Court in the case of MBIA v. Countrywide Home Loans, et al. Bransten held, among other things, that MBIA could proceed with its argument that BofA was vicariously liable for the debts of Countrywide as successor-in-interest, based on a claim of a de facto merger between the companies.

In the case, MBIA alleges that a significant percentage of tens of thousands of home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) and second-lien loans issued by Countrywide entities in various securitizations insured by MBIA failed to comply with Countrywide’s underwriting guidelines or other reps and warranties.  Bransten’s Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, issued on April 27, 2010, denied Countrywide and BofA’s motion to dismiss as to MBIA’s claims for fraud, breach of the implied covenant (though this claim was narrowed) and successor and vicarious liability against BofA, while granting the motion to dismiss as to MBIA’s claim for negligent misrepresentation.

The transcript of the oral argument surrounding this motion makes for particularly entertaining reading (at least for mortgage litigation nerds, such as myself).  In that hearing, David Apfel, counsel for BofA and Countrywide, argued that the successor liability claim was “frivolous,” and that MBIA should not be allowed even to pursue discovery regarding the issue.  Judge Bransten did not buy these arguments, denying BofA’s motion to dismiss as to the successor liability claim and ordering discovery to move forward.  Bransten also expressed significant dissatisfaction with the pace of the production of documents from BofA and Countrywide.  In response to Apfel’s statement that, “Countywide ha[s] been working hard [at discovery],” the Judge responded, “It’s not going well enough… Get discovery, documentary discovery done.”

This ruling came on the heels of another adverse ruling for Countrywide emanating from Bransten’s pen.  In a related case styled Syncora Guarantee, Inc. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al., Bransten ordered Countrywide to begin producing loan files underlying the delinquent loans in three securitizations insured by bond insurer, Syncora.  The Syncora case (along with MBIA v. Countrywide and FGIC v. Countrywide) is one of three related bond insurance cases involving BofA and Countrywide before Judge Bransten (note: bond insurers provide insurance on an entire securitization, or pool of loans, rather than on individual loans).  The acquisition of loan files, and servicers’ reluctance to turn over the same, is a critical issue for investors pursuing claims against originators and servicers for irresponsible lending practices in connection with the loans underlying the mortgage-backed securities they purchased.

Bill Frey, whose broker-dealer, Greenwich Financial Services, is the plaintiff in a lawsuit against Countrywide in New York state court, has been closely following the bond insurance litigation against Countrywide and BofA in New York.  He commented on Judge Bransten’s recent rulings that, “it sounds like [Judge Bransten] understands that you need to honor commitments and contracts if you are going to have an economy work.”  Frey’s suit, which seeks to force Countrywide to pay for the loan modifications it has agreed to perform in a settlement with the Attorney Generals from more than 30 states, awaits a ruling on Countrywide’s motion to dismiss.

Yet, while those with claims against Countrywide are watching this litigation closely, most of the mainstream media has been slow to recognize the significance of these decisions.  Certainly, if BofA is on the hook for the massive potential liabilities of Countrywide stemming from its years of volume lending, this could undermine Bank of America’s solvency, which, in turn, could have a dramatic ripple effect on the other major banks and the financial system as a whole.  BofA will have to take a stand, and whether or not this litigation is where BofA’s ultimate liability is determined, contesting Bransten’s vicarious liability ruling will be an important first battle.

Andrew Longstreth gets it.  In an April 29, 2010 article for AmLaw Litigation (subscription required), Longstreth notes that this is the first time a judge has allowed claims to proceed against BofA for the liabilities of Countrywide.  Longstreth quotes MBIA’s attorney, Phillip Selendy, as saying, “[the decision] is going to have an impact beyond this case.”  That could be the understatement of the year.

BofA/Countrywide filed the Notice of Appeal (available here) on May 28, 2010, indicating that it would be challenging the adverse portions of the April 27 ruling before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, in and for the First Division.  BofA/Countrywide also filed a Pre-Argument Statement (available here) before the Appellate Court, in which it argued that Judge Bransten improperly applied New York law, rather than Delaware law, to determine the issue of successor liability, and that MBIA failed to allege, as required, that the merger between the companies “was engineered to disadvantage Countrywide’s shareholders or creditors.”  BofA/Countrywide further decried the fact that, since Bransten’s decision on vicarious liability, both FGIC and Syncora have amended their complaints against Countrywide to add BofA as a defendant.

This may be one of the primary reasons that BofA has chosen to pursue the risky strategy of appealing Bransten’s Order.  Though the ruling does not definitively hold that BofA and Countrywide entered into a de facto merger–it simply allows such a claim to move forward–BofA faces the prospect of other litigants being emboldened to bring claims against BofA wherever they have claims against Countrywide.  Though BofA runs the risk that, by appealing, it could suffer an adverse ruling at the hands of the Appellate Division of New York Supreme Court–a ruling that would have broader precedential value than Bransten’s Order–BofA has presumably decided to take an early stand in the hopes of cutting off the flood of litigation before it begins.

Yet, it is unclear whether BofA has as strong a case as it thinks.  The de facto merger exception to the general rule that an acquirer does not become responsible for the liabilities of the acquired corporation turns on whether the acquirer absorbs and continues the prior operations of the acquired corporation or dissolves the company’s management and general business operations.  MBIA has alleged facts showing that BofA retired the Countrywide brand, including its website, and cites favorable New York case law holding that all-stock acquisitions, such as BofA’s acquisition of Countrywide, suggest that a de facto merger has occurred.  MBIA also cites BofA’s pursuit of a settlement of predatory lending suits with state Attorneys General immediately following its acquisition as evidence of the cessation and dissolution of Countrywide’s business.

BofA’s primary argument on appeal appears to be that Bransten erred in applying New York law to the vicarious liability claim.  The bank argues that Bransten should have instead applied Delaware law, which is more favorable to acquirers wishing to avoid successor liability.  But the argument has the distinct feel of a Hail Mary, as it did not appear to be a focus in BofA’s briefs, and Apfel did not even raise it during oral argument on the motion.

In fact, Apfel repeatedly exhorted Judge Bransten to read an order from Judge Mariana Pfaelzer the Central District of California from the case Argent v. Countrywide, which Apfel described as featuring “the exact same facts” as MBIA. Bransten actually excoriated Apfel at one point to direct her towards a New York case, saying “please, please, there must be a New York case that we can rely on.  At least, give me some guidance” (see transcript at 41-42).  Apfel responded, simply, “[o]kay.”  Id. At no point did BofA’s counsel argue that Delaware law should actually apply.

Instead, Bransten appeared to become quite irritated at Apfel’s repeated entreaties for her to read Argent–again, a California case.  At one point, after Bransten asked Apfel to move on to his next argument and Apfel again asked Bransten to read Argent, Bransten responded, “as I stated before, I’m going to read it, all right.  I mean, you don’t have to remind me to read it… It’s only been the tenth time asking me to read it” (see transcript at 41-42).

Meanwhile, the MBIA litigation moves forward, and MBIA has filed a Motion to Compel, to force Countrywide to produce 1) delinquent loan files, 2) documents Defendants previously produced to various state Attorneys General in connection with their settlement with Countrywide, and 3) documents relating to BofA’s successor liability.  The Reply brief, filed June 8, is available here.  BofA and Countrywide will certainly fight hard to avoid turning over these critical documents.  But, judging by Judge Bransten’s recent opinions, and her palpable frustration with BofA’s discovery conduct, I don’t like the bank’s chances of avoiding this production.

[Many thanks to Manal Mehta for sharing many of the documents featured in this post – IMG]
Posted in Attorneys General, BofA, bondholder actions, Countrywide, Greenwich Financial Services, loan files, merger, mortgage insurers, predatory lending, settlements, successor liability, vicarious liability, William Frey | 10 Comments

Federal Short Sale Programs Will Face Same Shortcoming As Workouts: Too Much Carrot, Not Enough Stick

With government-backed loan modification programs showing abysmal results, Washington has turned to short sales as the flavor of the week to ameliorate the foreclosure crisis.  Pursuant to the Treasury Department’s Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) initiative, effective April 5, loan servicers will be offered a $1,500 cash incentive to enter into “short sales” with borrowers, meaning allowing underwater borrowers to sell their homes at less than the amount of the unpaid principal balance remaining on their loans.

Yet, this mechanism suffers from the same drawbacks as loan modification programs–namely, that the approval or cooperation of the servicer is required to complete the sale.  Due to their well-documented conflicts of interest, it is highly unlikely that servicers will voluntarily agree to write down principal on the loans they service, which would also involve writing down their junior lien holdings and foregoing their right to collect late fees from delinquent borrowers out of the equity of the home.

A recent article published by Senior Editor Thomas Brom in California Lawyer magazine shows that experts and commentators have generally reached the same conclusion about the likelihood of success of short sale programs.  Besides including quotes from me and The Subprime Shakeout regarding the allocation of losses associated with the crisis and the intransigence of originators and services that have prevented such losses from being recognized, I enjoyed Brom’s article because it does a great job of summarizing the legal implications of short sale programs.

What I would add to that discussion is that Congress’ ongoing failure to make any decision regarding who should bear the losses associated with unchecked lending means that they will still be unable to voluntarily induce servicers to go along with their new programs.  If you’ll recall, Washington tried the same thing by offering $1,000 cash incentives to servicers who would engage in a government-approved loan modification.  And we all know how well Washington’s loan modification  programs have been performing.

Besides offending any notions of fairness by paying banks to liquidate loans they improperly approved in the first place, Congress’ attempt to induce compliance by raising the cash offered by $500 smacks of a fundamental misunderstanding of the incentives and dollars at play.  Servicers often hold junior liens on these homes in the amount of 5-20% of the value of the home.  For a home valued at $300,000, that’s a lien worth anywhere from $15,000 to $60,000 for which the security interest would be wiped out if the servicer agreed to the short sale.  Is any rational utility maximizing servicer going to give that up for $1,500 cash?  What about all the late fees the servicer is raking in for every month the borrower is delinquent that the servicer would now have to forgo?  What if the servicer also owns the primary lien on the house and would have to write off tens of thousands of dollars in principal?  A quick fact check shows that the HAFA short sale program will likely suffer the same fate as those programs that came before it.  Though Congress’ heart is in the right place, it lacks either the stomach or the understanding of the situation to craft an effective solution.

As I’ve talked about before, the carrot will not work with servicers.  They are too firmly entrenched and their livelihood is too dependent on the status quo to ever expect them to voluntarily comply.  Unless Congress creates a program that clearly defines who should bear the losses associated with alternatives to foreclosures–and optimally places them square in the lap of the lenders/servicers where the loan was originated in violation of the stated guidelines–we’ll be seeing more of the same foot-dragging and lip service from the servicers that we’ve seen all along.

Posted in allocation of loss, California Lawyer, conflicts of interest, foreclosure rate, HAFA, incentives, loan modifications, servicers, short-selling, Treasury | 1 Comment

Class Action Lawsuit Against Goldman Over ABACUS CDO Signals Time Is Right For Investor Lawsuits

The legal news is not good if you are a lender or investment bank who participated in the creation of mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) and other derivatives over the last few years.  But for investors who lost their shirts through their investments in these derivative products, the chinks appearing in the armor of the nation’s largest banks signal the time is right for aggressive legal action.

In the wake of the charges brought against Goldman Sachs last week by the SEC, Goldman already faces several lawsuits related to the ABACUS 2007-AC1 collateralized debt obligation (CDO) from investors and shareholders.  On Monday of this week, plaintiff Howard Sorkin filed a class action lawsuit (complaint available here) on behalf of all investors in Goldman Sachs common stock for losses stemming from the SEC’s action against the bank.  The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and alleges that Goldman knew of the impending SEC investigation as early as July 2009 (having received a “Wells Notice”), but concealed these facts from its investors.

A Wall Street Journal article indicates a similar class action lawsuit was also filed against Goldman this week by a shareholder named Ilene Richman.

Bloomberg reports that Goldman is also facing two derivative lawsuits related to Goldman’s involvement in the creation of subprime mortgage CDOs, with Goldman shareholders claiming that its top executives failed to provide sufficient oversight with respect to the deals.  In derivative actions, the shareholders make a demand upon the company’s board of directors to take action against its executives, and may only bring a lawsuit if the board refuses or is conflicted.  Though these actions against Goldman pertain to their participation in the creation of CDOs in general, facts regarding the SEC’s charges stemming from ABACUS 2007-AC1 should certainly figure prominently in the cases.

Bloomberg also notes that a class action is already pending against Goldman Sachs in federal court in New York.  The action, filed by Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi against Goldman Sachs, Moody’s, Fitch and others (Second Amended Complaint available here), alleges that Goldman misrepresented that certain mortgage-backed securities it sold with high ratings were not of the same quality as other investments with the same ratings. This action has been pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York since July 2009.

This flood of litigation against Goldman comes on the heels of a $600 million settlement entered into by Countrywide in a federal class action lawsuit brought by a group of New York retirement funds.  The deal still requires the approval of several pension boards who are plaintiffs in the case and the judge presiding over the case, but if accepted, it would be the largest settlement to arise out of the wave of subprime securities class actions filed in 2008 (and the 13th largest securities fraud class action settlement in history according to the RiskMetrics’ Group list). This result comes after Countrywide settled a lawsuit with dozens of Attorneys General for well over $8 billion in agreed-upon loan modifications (though readers familiar with this blog will remember that, pending the outcome of an investor lawsuit challenging the settlement, Countrywide stands to bear only a fraction of that cost, as it no longer owns most of the loans at issue).

All this leads me to believe that the time is right for investors with the temerity to take on the major Wall St. banks to file lawsuits to recover their losses stemming from subprime and Alt-A mortgage investment vehicles.  The evidence is overwhelming that lenders misrepresented their quality control standards and guidelines (or did not follow them at all), and thus are on the hook in most cases to buy back deficient loans or replace them with performing mortgages.  Moreover, the recent investigations into the role of investment banks in sponsoring and setting up these deals will provide an additional avenue for attack.  If investment banks knew that they were putting together a “sh***y deal,” as Goldman exec Daniel Sparks characterized a Goldman-sponsored CDO in an email produced to Congress this week, this would open the door to all kinds of claims, from Securities Act and Blue Sky statutory violations to common law contract and misrepresentation claims.

It is facts like these–showing that top bank executives knew the deals they were putting together were doomed to fail–that will turn the tide in investors’ favor.  Though banks have had some success in fending off mortgage crisis litigation thus far by using the “global financial catastrophe” defense, the argument that nobody saw this coming will carry much less water now that it is becoming clear that many–including top bank executives–saw the writing on the wall (read Michael Lewis’ new book, The Big Short, to dispel any notion that this crisis came as a total surprise).  Indeed, in suits filed pursuant to the 1933 Securities Act (even those brought before the SEC action against Goldman hit the news), investors are seeing more success than the mainstream media lets on, according to leading subprime litigation commentator, Kevin LaCroix.

So, for those investors who were waiting for the political and regulatory climate to turn before taking action, here is your wake up call.  With more and more evidence emerging that mortgage origination standards plummeted between 2005 and 2007–and that the investment banks condoned and profited from this irresponsible lending–there has never been a better time to become a mortgage crisis plaintiff.

Posted in abacus, Countrywide, derivative lawsuits, Goldman Sachs, investors, litigation, MBS, SEC, securities, securities fraud, shareholder lawsuits | 3 Comments

Say It Ain’t So: SEC Charges "Shoeless" Goldman Sachs With Setting Up CDO To Fail

In a move that represents a significant and unexpected expansion in U.S. regulators’ efforts to crack down on Wall Street, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has charged Goldman Sachs, Wall Street’s most powerful bank, with fraud over its marketing of a subprime mortgage derivative product.  The complaint alleges that Goldman designed and marketed a “synthetic collateralized debt obligation” (“CDO”) known as ABACUS 2007-AC1 in order to give investor Paulson & Co., Inc. the ability to short subprime mortgage bonds, without disclosing to the bank on the other side of the deal of the bond insurer that was acting as the deal manager that Paulson had shorted more than $1 billion of the securities.  Details of the complaint are still emerging, but this Reuters Factbox contains a good summary of the complaint and the details of ABACUS 2007-AC1.

News of the charges sent most equities and commodities into a tailspin, with the exception of the stocks of some mortgage insurers, such as MBIA and AIG (whose bond insurer, United Guaranty, is involved in several suits with lenders, including Countrywide), which saw gains as investors anticipated that the companies would obtain additional fodder for their active lawsuits against banks such as Countrywide/BofA, Citigroup and Credit Suisse.
At around 4:00 PM EDT today, the Goldman Sachs Group issued the following comments response to the SEC complaint, which were posted at theflyonthewall.com:
We are disappointed that the SEC would bring this action related to a single transaction in the face of an extensive record which establishes that the accusations are unfounded in law and fact. We want to emphasize the following four critical points which were missing from the SEC’s complaint. 1) Goldman Sachs Lost Money On The Transaction. Goldman Sachs, itself, lost more than $90M. Our fee was $15M. We were subject to losses and we did not structure a portfolio that was designed to lose money. 2) Extensive Disclosure Was Provided. IKB, a large German Bank and sophisticated CDO market participant and ACA Capital Management, the two investors, were provided extensive information about the underlying mortgage securities. The risk associated with the securities was known to these investors, who were among the most sophisticated mortgage investors in the world. These investors also understood that a synthetic CDO transaction necessarily included both a long and short side. 3) ACA, the Largest Investor, Selected The Portfolio. The portfolio of mortgage backed securities in this investment was selected by an independent and experienced portfolio selection agent after a series of discussions, including with Paulson & Co., which were entirely typical of these types of transactions. ACA had the largest exposure to the transaction, investing $951M. It had an obligation and every incentive to select appropriate securities. 4) Goldman Sachs Never Represented to ACA That Paulson Was Going To Be A Long Investor. The SEC’s complaint accuses the firm of fraud because it didn’t disclose to one party of the transaction who was on the other side of that transaction. As normal business practice, market makers do not disclose the identities of a buyer to a seller and vice versa. Goldman Sachs never represented to ACA that Paulson was going to be a long investor.
Goldman has repeatedly put forth this type of argument in response to mounting criticism about the bank’s conduct leading up to the financial meltdown (see, e.g., Goldman’s response to allegations in an article in the New York Times to the effect that Goldman used inside information to short the same CDOs it had created).  Namely, that Goldman Sachs would not do anything that would cause it to lose money, that Goldman never discloses who it does business with, and that Goldman only deals with sophisticated investors.  But, these defenses will hold little water if evidence emerges that Goldman knowingly set up a process for creating this CDO that allowed a more favored investor on one side of the transaction to tilt the odds in its favor, or if it turned out that Goldman also bet against ABACUS 2007-AC1.  These sorts of facts would recall images of arsonists burning down buildings to collect insurance or the 1919 Black Sox getting paid to throw the World Series.  Otherwise, it may be very difficult indeed to prove fraud, especially against the strong legal team Goldman is certain to retain.

Paulson & Co., Inc., who made waves by posting yearly returns in the 300-600% range in the aftermath of the global financial crisis by shorting subprime and Alt-A mortgage-backed securities, has not been formally charged with any wrongdoing by the SEC.  However, the company also issued a statement regarding the SEC’s Complaint, which was posted on Dealbreaker this afternoon:

As the SEC said at its press conference, Paulson is not the subject of this complaint, made no misrepresentations and is not the subject of any charges.
While Paulson purchased credit protection from Goldman Sachs on securities issued under the ABACUS ABS CDO program, we were not involved in the marketing of any ABACUS products to any third parties.
ACA as collateral manager had sole authority over the selection of all collateral in the CDO, securities of which were subsequently rated AAA by both S&P and Moody’s.
Paulson did not sponsor or initiate Goldman’s ABACUS program, which involved at least 20 transactions other than that described in the SEC’s complaint.
SOURCE Paulson & Co. Inc.

If the writing wasn’t already on the wall, this complaint makes official the shift in U.S. regulatory policy from one of protecting large Wall St. banks to one aimed at holding them accountable.  This should only encourage mortgage insurers and mortgage bond investors to ramp up their efforts to recover losses from lenders through the courts.  We will certainly be following this story as it develops.

Posted in AIG, CDOs, Goldman Sachs, investors, lenders, MBIA, mortgage insurers, Paulson and Co., regulation, SEC, securities, securities fraud, Wall St. | Leave a comment

BlackRock Puts Pressure On Banks To Absorb Losses

BlackRock, a major asset management firm and one of the largest investors in U.S. mortgage bonds, announced last week that banks would have to absorb the losses on their holdings in second-lien mortgages before it would resume purchasing “private-label” mortgage bonds in any significant quantity.  This represents, to my knowledge, the first instance of an investor threatening to boycott future bond issues as a strategy to solving the gridlock surrounding mortgage-backed securities.

As I’ve discussed in the past, these toxic assets have remained largely illiquid because the players involved cannot agree who should bear losses associated with distressed mortgages.  While loan modifications, short sale programs and other workout plans have been rolled out and encouraged by Washington, banks acting as servicers for the underlying loans have been reluctant to comply due to their large second-lien holdings (that would be wiped out in the event of a modification) and their dependence on the late fees generated by loans in delinquency status.  Such conflicts of interest have thrown a wrench in plans to rescue troubled homeowners, liquidate toxic assets and restart the stalled-out mortgage bond market.

But, now that private investors are beginning to return to the U.S. mortgage market, and there is talk of the issuance of new securitizations, I think investors like BlackRock are making a wise move in leveraging their massive capital (BlackRock manages fixed income investments of over $580 billion) to force banks to write down their second-lien mortgages.  And lest the investor be seen as a bully, let’s not forget that the banks acting as servicers for these loans were often the same institutions whose lending arms irresponsibly created these loans in the first place.  When you throw in the fact that second-lien loans are structured to take the first loss in the event of default, and that these servicers should be working in the best interests of investors to modify loans pursuant to their contracts and their servicing obligations, BlackRock’s position seems imminently reasonable.

[Thank you to Chris Corio for bringing this story to my attention – IMG]

Posted in allocation of loss, BlackRock, conflicts of interest, investors, irresponsible lending, junior liens, loan modifications, MBS, securities, toxic assets | 1 Comment