Pfaelzer Dismissal of Bank of America from Countrywide Suit Throws Investors for a Loop

Is Bank of America on the hook for Countrywide’s liabilities for defective loans?  Depends on which judge you ask.

With the recent decision by Judge Mariana Pfaelzer to dismiss BofA as a defendant in the case of Maine State Retirement System v. Countrywide Financial Corp., et al. (“Opinion,” link also provided at the end of this article), a difference of opinion has emerged among jurists over whether BofA should bear successor liability for the debts of its new lending subsidiary.  Judge Eileen Bransten in New York state court held that bond insurer MBIA could proceed with claims against BofA as the successor-in-interest to Countrywide under the theory that the bank’s purchase of the subprime originator constituted a de facto merger.  Judge Pfaelzer, on the other hand, has now ruled in California District Court that the plaintiff pension funds could not make such a claim, and has dismissed BofA from the lawsuit.

Two primary factors account for this difference of opinion.  First and foremost is the fact that each judge applied a different state’s law to the question of whether the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that Bank of America’s purchase of Countrywide’s assets should be treated as a de facto merger.  Judge Pfaelzer, turning to California choice of law principles under the federal Erie doctrine (as the forum state), applied Delaware law, which she found had historically used the doctrine of de facto merger “sparingly” and “only in very limited contexts” (Opinion at 6).  Delaware courts have held that this exception to the general rule that the purchasing corporation does not assume the liabilities of the selling corporation in an asset sale generally requires a showing of intent to defraud, such as an allegation that the sale was designed to disadvantage creditors or shareholders.

Over the objections of the plaintiffs in Maine State Retirement, who asked the judge to apply California law, Pfaelzer held that there was an actual conflict between the law of the two states and that Delaware (the state in which Countrywide was incorporated) had a greater interest in seeing its law applied than California (the state in which Countrywide had its principal place of business).  In particular, Pfaelzer found an actual conflict in that California law was much less restrictive than Delaware law in finding a de facto merger, the latter looking more to the substance of the transaction to see if it operated like a merger, notwithstanding its structure.  The Judge then relied on the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws–which is a well-respected but non-binding treatise on conflict of laws principles–in finding that Delaware, as the state of incorporation, had a greater interest in having its law applied to the determination of this issue.  Certainly, this holding would have been stronger had Pfaelzer been able to cite to binding or persuasive case law to support her opinion.

By contrast, Judge Bransten applied New York law to the same question (opinion available here), which operates similarly to California law in looking more to the substance of the transaction than its form.  Bransten did not conduct a choice of law analysis, as the issue was not raised by the parties in the course of arguing the motion to dismiss (transcript available here), and thus simply assumed that New York law applied.  Of course, this did not stop BofA from challenging Bransten’s ruling on appeal, arguing that she should have applied Delaware law to the question of whether MBIA could state a claim for successor liability.  Though this issue is still up on appeal, my take is that BofA is unlike to prevail on an issue it did not appear to raise or properly preserve before the lower court.

The second major factor that contributed to these divergent rulings is the level of detail included by the respective plaintiffs in their allegations regarding the transaction.  The primary inquiry for New York courts in this regard is whether the acquirer absorbed and continued the prior operations of the acquired corporation or dissolved the company’s management and general business operations.  In support of its allegations in this regard in MBIA, the plaintiff alleged facts showing that BofA retired the Countrywide brand, including its website; cited favorable New York case law holding that all-stock acquisitions, such as BofA’s acquisition of Countrywide, suggest that a de facto merger has occurred; and cited to BofA’s pursuit of a settlement of predatory lending suits with state Attorneys General immediately following its acquisition as evidence that BofA had taken over Countrywide’s business.  All of these facts led Bransten to conclude that MBIA had alleged a de facto merger in which BofA intended to absorb and continue the operations of Countrywide.

In Maine State Retirement, the Judge Pfaelzer found that the plaintiffs had not made allegations sufficient to satisfy any of the de facto merger factors under Delaware law.  Namely, the Judge found that the plaintiffs had failed to allege 1) that Countrywide did not receive valid consideration in the acquisition, 2) that the asset sale failed to comport with law, 3) that any creditors or stockholders were injured by way of the sale, or 4) that the sale was designed to disadvantage such creditors or stockholders (Opinion at 15).  Whether the plaintiffs were unprepared for Judge Pfaelzer to apply Delaware law or simply felt that there was little chance of satisfying these factors should Delaware law apply (and, indeed, it would be hard to say that Countrywide shareholders received insufficient consideration for the sale, knowing what we know now), the fact remains that the plaintiffs’ allegations in Maine State Retirement lacked the particularity or the detail of those in MBIA.  That being said, the Maine State plaintiffs had an uphill battle from the beginning, as Pfaelzer had already issued a conclusory ruling in a previous case, entitled Argent Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund v. Countrywide, to the effect that BofA did not face successor liability for Countrywide because no bad faith had been alleged (the case eventually settled out of court).

All this does little to guide investors and other plaintiffs looking to hold BofA accountable for the fallout from Countrywide’s reckless lending spree leading up to the mortgage crisis.  Certainly, it will mean we’re more likely to see lawsuits against Countrywide brought in New York than California going forward.  But investors can’t be sure that there will be anything to fight for should they take Countrywide to court and secure a judgment.  Though there are no concrete signs that Countrywide is currently unable to satisfy its debts, commentators have speculated that BofA is holding onto a potential trump card–the option of throwing Countrywide into bankruptcy down the road in an attempt to cut off its liability, should the unit reach that point.  If nothing else, this recent decision provides yet another incentive for investors with valuable claims with respect to Countrywide mortgage backed securities and other derivatives to act quickly to enforce these claims.  Each additional day that they wait could mean a smaller pot at the end of the rainbow.

[Update: BofA ultimately dropped its appeal of Judge Bransten’s Order denying the bank’s motion to dismiss on the issue of successor liability — IMG]

Judge Pfaelzer Order Dismissing BofA in Maine State Retirement System v. Countrywide, et al.

Posted in acquisitions, allocation of loss, appeals, balance sheets, banks, BofA, Countrywide, investors, jurisdiction, lawsuits, lenders, liabilities, liquidity, litigation, MBIA, merger, monoline actions, motions to dismiss, private label MBS, responsibility, securities fraud, subprime, successor liability, vicarious liability | Tagged , , , , , | 6 Comments

Federal Regulators Pick Fight with Banks Over Collapsed Credit Unions

Just when you thought the hubbub surrounding mortgage backed securities (MBS) was starting to subside, federal regulators have taken their most aggressive stance yet against the banks that sold toxic loans as investment grade securities, according to an article in the Wall Street Journal (subscription required). The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the agency that oversees federal credit unions and guarantees the deposits of both federal and state-chartered credit unions, has threatened to sue Goldman Sachs, BofA’s Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, and JP Morgan if the banks refuse to refund over $50 billion in MBS purchased by five wholesale credit unions that have since collapsed.

With some minor differences, the NCUA is to credit unions as the FDIC is to banks, overseeing the safety and soundness of the member-owned credit unions that act like banks for groups of workers in the same field (e.g. firefighters, teachers, or military servicepeople). In its role as conservator, the NCUA seized wholesale credit unions WesCorp, U.S. Central, Southwest, Members United and Constitution between 2009 and 2010, which had collapsed under the weight of their investments in MBS. Now, in an effort to recover the losses on the bonds it inherited–currently priced at half their face value–the NCUA is accusing the banks that created them of misrepresenting the risks.

Though many other federal regulators, including the Fed, the FDIC and the Treasury, hold large amounts of distressed mortgage derivatives, none prior to the NCUA has seemed interested in confronting these issuer banks. Sure, the New York Fed, which holds $70 billion worth of these assets from its rescues of Bear Stearns and AIG, has said that it would be engaging in a broad effort to enforce its rights. However, the only public action we’ve seen the Fed take in this regard is to sign its name to the letter sent by Kathy Patrick to Countrywide and Bank of New York back in October 2010. According to several sources, this amounts to little more than an effort at striking a sweetheart deal for BofA that would preserve the bank’s financial strength while setting a low bar for future settlements. Notably, this effort has made very little noise since its opening salvo (with both sides saying that they are currently engaging in negotiations).

The most interesting thing about the NCUA’s efforts is their focus on misrepresentation. As I’ve noted, we’re seeing a trend away from putback lawsuits and towards claims based on misrepresentations by issuing banks, such as Securities Act, Blue Sky and tort claims. Though plaintiffs originally shied away from alleging fraud or misrepresentation because they had little hard evidence to support such claims, significant revelations from discovery in ongoing litigation and testimony in federal investigations have exposed shenanigans in the loan buying and packaging business during the boom years of 2005-2008. In addition, as the recent holding in the FHLB of Pittsburgh case against JPM (analysis here and full order here) makes clear, less evidence is needed than previously thought to ensure the survival of misrepresentation claims.

In the NCUA’s case, sources indicate that the reason the agency is banging the drum of misrepresentation rather than breach of rep and warranty is that it may not be able to overcome the significant procedural hurdles required to obtain standing. The NCUA, on its own, does not appear to hold at least 25% of the voting rights in many MBS trusts, meaning it would have to band together with other investors to pursue these claims. This is still a possibility, but until then, the NCUA is wise to pursue the more accessible Securities Act and Blue Sky claims.

Turning to the big picture, the WSJ article quotes Quinn Emanuel lawyer Jonathan Pickhardt as saying, “[t]here’s plenty more litigation yet to come,” and I tend to agree. The statute of limitations (“SOL”) for federal securities claims is five years, while the SOL for rep and warranty contract claims under New York law is six years, meaning that claims on securities backed by 2005- and 2006-vintage loans will expire en masse by the end of this year. Should institutional investors fail to take action on these assets, despite the emergence of substantial evidence that these assets were misrepresented or defective, they could be exposed to breach of fiduciary duty claims by the pensioners, retirees and ordinary Americans whose funds they oversee.

Thus, I expect to see a significant number of MBS-related lawsuits hit the courts this year, including action by the Investor Syndicate, which has been ominously silent over the last few months. When that 800-lb gorilla finally begins beating its chest, Wall Street and institutional investors alike will be forced to sit up and take notice.

Posted in BofA, bondholder actions, Citigroup, Credit Unions, FDIC, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Kathy Patrick, litigation, Merrill Lynch, misrespresentation, NCUA, private label MBS, Regulators, securities fraud | Leave a comment

Midwinter Conference Sparks Lively Discourse, Focuses on Servicing Deficiencies

I just returned from my first Midwinter Housing Finance Conference in Park City, Utah.  Though the conference, organized by Brian Hershkowitz, has been an annual favorite of snow-loving housing professionals for decades, it tends to receive far less publicity than the American Securitization Forum (ASF), which takes place around the same time every year.  That will hopefully begin to change, as I found this year’s conference to be engaging and, ultimately, newsworthy, thanks to a keynote speech by Fed Reserve Board Gov. Sarah Raskin that placed the servicing industry directly in the cross hairs.

In fact, while a wide range of topics was discussed during the conference’s three days of presentations and panels, servicing deficiencies dominated the conversation.  Most conference participants agreed that the default servicing model was broken, and continued to be major drag on the recovery of the housing market.  There was also a consensus that servicer conflicts of interest and misaligned incentives played a large role in these deficiencies–stymieing loan modification programs and contributing to the latent foreclosure (aka “fraudclosure”) crisis.  However, it seemed that each participant had a different idea about what it would take to fix this important industry. 

This diversity of opinion can be attributed in part to the complexity of the issues, but also to the diversity of the conference participants themselves–something that I found to be one of the strengths of this conference.  The professionals in attendance were not limited to one segment of the housing industry, but included investors, regulators, bankers, academics, financiers, consultants and members of the press.  Indeed, the number of different opinions about the problems with the servicing industry seemed to outnumber even the participants.

I presented on a panel that served as a microcosm of this blend of viewpoints.  The session was called “Investor Putbacks, MERS & the Capital Markets,” and included a presentation on MERS by Christopher Peterson, a law professor at the University of Utah; a presentation on Trends in Investor RMBS Litigation by me, a blogger and litigation consultant; and a presentation on what investors are looking for these days by Neil Powers, a fixed income investor at Vectors Research Mgmt.  Though the topics and viewpoints differed, they combined nicely in my opinion to paint a multilayer picture of the current MBS landscape.  The lively Q&A that followed only enriched that perspective.  

Of course, another topic that arose frequently during conference sessions was the future of the GSEs, especially with the White House’s release on Friday of a white paper suggesting the gradual winding down of Freddie and Fannie.  Cal Professor Dwight M. Jaffee gave an reassuring presentation on why he believes a privatized US mortgage market will work–a refreshing viewpoint for those of us who believe in the future of private mortgage finance.  This was followed, appropriately enough, by a presentation by Fannie Mae’s Doug Duncan called “Economics and Mortgage Market Analysis,” in which he noted that while housing fundamentals were improving, homeownership rates will likely trend downward due to weakness in demand.

But the most surprising moment in the conference came with Fed Gov. Raskin’s speech, the full text of which is available here.  Striking a decidedly more direct tone than her Fed counterparts, Raskin noted that “widespread weaknesses exist in the servicing industry… [T]hese deficiencies pose significant risk to mortgage servicing and foreclosure processes, impair the functioning of mortgage markets, and diminish overall accountability to homeowners.”  She also called out the servicers that are affiliates of the larger banks, saying:

For those in the housing and mortgage fields, making needed changes will not be easy. In particular, for those in the mortgage servicing industry, it means difficult changes and significant investments to rectify broken systems. For those servicers who are subsidiaries or affiliates of a broader parent financial institution, the responsibility for change and further investment absolutely extends up to that parent company, many of which have enjoyed substantial profits while their servicing arms have been run on the cheap.

While Raskin’s speech was short on aggressive proposals to fix these problems, such as legislating a divestment of servicing arms by the major banks to avoid conflicts of interest, she can be commended for attacking head-on the current problems with default servicing and suggesting a variety of alternative business models that might ease some of the problems with this industry.  And though the Midwinter Conference participants could have had a lively debate about the merits of these various models, I think almost all of us could agree with Raskin’s statement that, “Until these operational problems are addressed once and for all, the foreclosure crisis will continue and the housing sector will languish.”

As I checked out of the St. Regis in Park City and headed home, I was left to marinate on these words and the fact that while responsible servicing might not have prevented the Mortgage Crisis, it certainly would have made the cleanup a whole lot easier.  Here’s hoping that the many intelligent folks I met at Midwinter and throughout this industry can reach a consensus on building a better servicing model going forward.

Posted in ASF, conflicts of interest, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, incentives, investors, litigation, Midwinter Conference, Presentations, Winding Down GSES | 1 Comment

Commentators Concur: Trustee Involvement Signals Shift in RMBS Litigation


A few weeks ago, I published an article suggesting that the increased cooperation of MBS trustees may signal the turning point in bondholder litigation.  It seems I’m not alone in reaching this conclusion.

The following week, on January 27, Adam Levitin, associate law professor at Georgetown University and vocal commentator on banks’ potential liabilities stemming from subprime lending, published a blog post entitled, “Clash of the Titans: RMBS Edition.” The post does a great job of summarizing the key early litigation in this space, including linking to some articles from The Subprime Shakeout, while also analyzing where this trend may be heading.

Levitin’s verdict?  That the storm we’ve long predicted is coming.  Levitin writes, “We’re about to witness the main event in financial institution internecine warefare: investment funds (MBS buyers) vs. banks (MBS sellers).”  The catalyst he identifies is that a group of large institutional investors has banded together and filed suit, in what Levintin calls the first “A-list litigation.”  This would be the case filed by Dexia, New York Life, and TIAA-CREF, among others, against Countrywide and BAC.

Besides including the usual slew of allegations regarding loosening guidelines, breaches of underwriting reps and warranties and misrepresentations regarding lending standards, Dexia and the other plaintiffs raise (for the first time I can recall in either bondholder or insurer litigation) chain of title issues regarding whether ownership of the note and deed was properly transferred through the securitization chain.  The Complaint discusses in detail the revelations of Linda DeMartini from Kemp v. Countrywide that Countrywide routinely did not transfer the mortgage note when it sold a loan into securitization.  Such errors became meaningful after the Massachusetts Supreme Court handed down the Ibanez decision, holding that the entity foreclosing had to able to show that they were the holder of the note and deed at the time they initiated foreclosure proceedings.  As Levitin points out, the Dexia complaint merely scratches the surface on chain of title issues, but it gives credibility to an argument that was long dismissed by the banks as a mere technicality.

Levitin also agrees that trustee intercession on behalf of bondholders could only mean the times are a-changin’. In that regard, Levitin writes, “It looks like the trustees see that it’s checkmate once the investors get to the collective action threshold and are finally squeezing the servicers… This ain’t gonna end pretty.”

One day after Levitin’s article came out, industry publication Debtwire reported a similar trend.  In an article entitled, “JPMorgan slowly loosens grip on loan files in bitter EMC, WaMu buyback disputes” (subscription only), reporter Allison Pyburn, whose writing has long reflected a strong handle on these issues, states:

This week, JPMorgan also agreed to relinquish 400 of the 902 loan files requested that serve as collateral for Bear Stearns Mortgage Funding Trust 2007-AR2, according to a letter filed Wednesday in Delaware Chancery Court in Wilmington. The case, Wells Fargo Bank v. EMC Mortgage Corp., has investor standing in 42% of the deal and loan level data alleged to prove a breach of the 902 loan files requested on 20 September.

Movements by the bank to turn over loan documents to trustees investigating buyback disputes could represent a shift of power between banks and investors seeking buybacks, said an RMBS investor and lawyer familiar with the disputes.  A JPMorgan Chase spokesman declined to comment.

Make no mistake about it, loan files are the key to unraveling this whole mess.  Once bondholders obtain possession of these critical documents–and eventually they will–they will be privy to a mountain of fodder for rep and warranty and misrepresentation claims, and losses will flow back to the originators and underwriters of these toxic loans.  The servicers (a.k.a. the originators and keepers of the files related to many of these loans) have been able to sit on their hands and refuse to turn over loan files thus far because passive trustees and arduous procedural hurdles have stood between the bondholders and loan access rights.  When this changes–and all evidence suggests that it already is–servicers will be left without a leg to stand on, and the files will be produced, either voluntarily, or by court order.  Brace yourself for the ruckus.

Posted in allocation of loss, bondholder actions, chain of title, emc, investors, loan files, servicers, TIAA-CREF, Trustees, Wells Fargo | 3 Comments

Ambac Drops Bombshell Proposed Amended Complaint on JP Morgan, EMC

In a pleading filled with allegations that can only be described as shocking, Ambac has accused Bear Stearns and its former subsidiary EMC Mortgage (both now owned by JP Morgan) of a parade of horribles in its proposed amended complaint in its case over defective residential mortgages in the Southern District of New York.  If only a fraction of these allegations are true–and the documentary evidence cited in support suggests that they are–it constitutes the most damning evidence thus far that securitizing banks engaged in out-and-out fraud in the race to churn out more RMBS and enhance their bottom lines.

Among the allegations are that Bear Stearns (now JP Morgan Securities) profited by obtaining settlements from certain lenders that sold the bank defective loans, while at the same time denying repurchase requests from investors and insurers based on the same loans and the same deficiencies (thereby “double-dipping” on these loans); that Bear Stearns was simultaneously selling short shares of banks holding Ambac-insured securities as it denied the bond insurer the benefit of its contractual right to have Bear repurchase defective loans; that Bear covertly cut the time allowed for early payment defaults without telling investors, allowing it to securitize more loans that had already gone bad; and that Bear ignored its own due diligence findings on loan deficiencies, lied to rating agencies about this data, and then went ahead and securitized these loans, anyway.

I first reported on this lawsuit back in November of 2008, and noted that while Ambac had accused EMC of originating mortgages it knew could not be repaid, it stopped short of alleging fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation on the part of the originator of loans or arranger of the securitizations it had agreed to insure.  Apparently, Ambac was simply waiting for better evidence of such misrepresentation to emerge during the discovery process.  It now looks like the strategy paid off in spades.

I can’t possibly do justice to this slew of new allegations against Bear, culled mostly from emails and testimony obtained by the bond insurer in discovery, so I will just recommend that you read the Proposed Amended Complaint (long but well worth it) or some of the excellent news articles that came out today.  I am quoted in this article by Jody Shenn at Bloomberg News about Ambac amending its complaint to allege that Bear Stearns was talking out of both sides of its mouth on the same deficient loans.  This is another great story from The Atlantic, which has been following the news of whistleblowers within EMC since May of 2010, discussing some of the colorful emails obtained from Bear Stearns execs, including one from Bear deal manager Nicolas Smith on August 11th, 2006 to Keith Lind, a Managing Director on the trading desk, referring to a particular bond, SACO 2006-8, as “SACK OF SHIT [2006-]8” and saying, “I hope your [sic] making a lot of money off this trade.”

Much more to come on this fascinating new development.  I shouldn’t be surprised anymore by the audacity and utter lack of principles shown by Wall Street execs over the last five years, but somehow, I still am.

Posted in accounting fraud, Ambac, bad faith, Bear Stearns, Complaints, discovery, due diligence firms, emc, JPMorgan, monoline actions, rep and warranty, repurchase, RMBS, securities fraud | 12 Comments