Category Archives: mortgage market

Cracks in Commercial Real Estate Market Usher in All-Too-Familiar CMBS Putback Litigation and Risk of Broader Distress

Posted on March 23, 2026 by Isaac Gradman

It has been said that history repeats itself. This is perhaps not quite correct; it merely rhymes. – Theodor Reik, 1965, Curiosities of the Self: Illusions We Have about Ourselves  I am reminded frequently of the above quote when I … Continue reading →

Posted in allocation of loss, banks, bondholder actions, bondholders, borrower fraud, broader credit crisis, Certificateholders, Chetrit, CMBS, contract rights, CRE, Deloitte and Touche, Fannie Mae, fraud, Freddie Mac, interest rates, investors, JPMorgan, lawsuits, liabilities, litigation, MBS, misrespresentation, mortgage fraud, mortgage market, pre-investment due diligence, putbacks, re-underwriting, rep and warranty, repurchase, responsibility, securities, securitization, sellers and sponsors, servicers, statutes of limitations, The Subprime Shakeout, underwriting practices | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Investor End Games: All Is Not Well in the Garden

Posted on August 29, 2012 by igradman

“As long as the roots are not severed, all is well.  And all will be well in the garden.” – Chance the Gardener, Being There (1979) With Judge Barbara Kapnick announcing earlier this month that the approval hearing in Bank … Continue reading →

Posted in AIG, allocation of loss, ASF, Attorneys General, Bank of New York, banks, BlackRock, Bloomberg, BofA, bondholder actions, causes of the crisis, conflicts of interest, consitutionality, contract rights, costs of the crisis, Countrywide, damages, Deutsche Bank, discovery, eminent domain, fiduciary duties, foreclosure crisis, fraud, global settlement, Grais and Ellsworth, impact of the crisis, incentives, investors, irresponsible lending, Judge Barbara Kapnick, Judge Eileen Bransten, junior liens, Kathy Patrick, lawsuits, lenders, lending guidelines, liabilities, LIBOR manipulation, liquidity, litigation, litigation costs, lobbying, MBIA, MBS, misrespresentation, monoline actions, monolines, mortgage fraud, mortgage insurers, mortgage market, negative equity, Neil Barofsky, private label MBS, procedural hurdles, putbacks, recession, rep and warranty, repurchase, Residential Capital, responsibility, restructuring, RMBS, securities, securitization, sellers and sponsors, settlements, standing, statistical sampling, statutes of limitations, successor liability, summary judgment, The Subprime Shakeout, too big to fail, toxic assets, Treasury, Trustees, underwriting guidelines, underwriting practices, US Bank, vicarious liability, waiver of rights to sue, Wall St., Walnut Place, Way Too Big to Fail, Wells Fargo, William Frey | 2 Comments

The Top 5 RMBS Cases to Watch this Summer: No. 5 – Syncora v. EMC

Posted on June 11, 2012 by igradman

As summer approaches and the weather turns warmer, RMBS litigation is also heating up, generating long-awaited precedent that will dictate how mortgage losses are likely to be allocated by the courts.  In order to keep my readers apprised on what … Continue reading →

Posted in Alison Frankel, allocation of loss, Bank of New York, banks, Bear Stearns, broader credit crisis, contract rights, costs of the crisis, Countrywide, emc, investors, JPMorgan, Judge Eileen Bransten, Judge Paul Crotty, Judicial Opinions, lawsuits, lending guidelines, liabilities, litigation, loss causation, loss estimates, monoline actions, monolines, mortgage market, private label MBS, putbacks, rep and warranty, repurchase, responsibility, RMBS, subprime, The Subprime Shakeout, Trustees, underwriting guidelines, underwriting practices | 12 Comments

Guest Post: The Migratory Patterns of Yield-Hungry Investors

Posted on April 12, 2012 by igradman

Editor’s Note: in this guest post, former bond insurance insider Steve Ruterman discusses important considerations for investing in private label MBS beyond credit risk analysis, including how investors can benefit from understanding the differences in servicer behavior and business models.  … Continue reading →

Posted in Attorneys General, bondholder actions, conflicts of interest, firing servicers, foreclosure rate, guest posts, hedge funds, incentives, investors, junior liens, loan modifications, loan seasoning, MBIA, MBS, moral hazard, mortgage market, pre-investment due diligence, private label MBS, projecting risk adjusted returns, putbacks, regulation, Regulators, servicer defaults, servicer reports, servicers, subprime | Leave a comment

Under AG Foreclosure Settlement, Servicers Get Credit for Things They’re Supposed to Do

Posted on April 10, 2012 by igradman

Last week, District Court Judge Rosemary Collyer approved the Attorney General Foreclosure Settlement (“AGFS”) without a hearing, and without any objection from investors.  According to the Judge, the Consent Judgment between the nation’s five largest servicers and the Attorneys General … Continue reading →

Posted in Adam Levitin, Ally Bank, Attorneys General, auditing, bailout, Bank of New York, banks, BofA, Citigroup, conflicts of interest, contract rights, costs of the crisis, Countrywide, damages, foreclosure crisis, foreclosure rate, global settlement, homeowner relief, improper documentation, incentives, investors, JPMorgan, junior liens, liabilities, MBS, mortgage market, Neil Barofsky, pooling agreements, press, private label MBS, RMBS, robo-signers, servicer defaults, servicers, settlements, Wells Fargo | 2 Comments