Category Archives: firing servicers

Guest Post: The Migratory Patterns of Yield-Hungry Investors

Posted on April 12, 2012 by igradman

Editor’s Note: in this guest post, former bond insurance insider Steve Ruterman discusses important considerations for investing in private label MBS beyond credit risk analysis, including how investors can benefit from understanding the differences in servicer behavior and business models.  … Continue reading →

Posted in Attorneys General, bondholder actions, conflicts of interest, firing servicers, foreclosure rate, guest posts, hedge funds, incentives, investors, junior liens, loan modifications, loan seasoning, MBIA, MBS, moral hazard, mortgage market, pre-investment due diligence, private label MBS, projecting risk adjusted returns, putbacks, regulation, Regulators, servicer defaults, servicer reports, servicers, subprime | Leave a comment

Why Mortgage Loan Servicers Behave as They Do

Posted on March 5, 2012 by igradman

Editor’s Note: It seems that we can’t go three months without hearing about yet another species of misconduct by mortgage servicers that shifts losses onto the lienholders they are supposed to protect.  We’ve read reports about force-placed insurance, inflated appraisal … Continue reading →

Posted in accounting fraud, allocation of loss, appraisals, auditing, banks, broader credit crisis, causes of the crisis, conflicts of interest, contract rights, costs of the crisis, firing servicers, foreclosure crisis, improper documentation, incentives, investigations, junior liens, lending guidelines, loan modifications, MBIA, MBS, monolines, mortgage fraud, private label MBS, RMBS, robo-signers, securitization, servicer defaults, servicers, settlements, subprime, underwriting guidelines, underwriting practices, Way Too Big to Fail | 4 Comments

Creditor Rights: Use Them All!

Posted on July 14, 2011 by igradman

by Steve Ruterman, guest blogger Much of the focus of mortgage crisis-related litigation and news coverage has been directed at put-back rights as a potential source of loss mitigation for mortgage creditors, including investors and bond insurers.  However, far less … Continue reading →

Posted in auditing, banks, bondholder actions, chain of title, contract rights, due diligence firms, Event of Default, firing servicers, freeriders, guest posts, improper documentation, incentives, investors, irresponsible lending, lenders, lending guidelines, loan files, MBIA, MBS, negligence and recklessness, pooling agreements, private label MBS, putbacks, re-underwriting, rep and warranty, RMBS, robo-signers, securitization, servicer defaults, servicers, standing, The Subprime Shakeout, Trustees, underwriting practices | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Investor Syndicate Fires Warning Shot Across Trustee Bows

Posted on July 24, 2010 by Isaac Gradman

As first reported by Reuters on Wednesday, and as further detailed by Bloomberg today, the Investor Syndicate has finally begun to emerge from the shadows and give securitization trustees a hint at what’s coming.  According to Talcott Franklin, the Dallas … Continue reading →

Posted in fiduciary duties, firing servicers, Investor Syndicate, irresponsible lending, private label MBS, repurchase, reserve reporting, securitization, servicer defaults, Servicer Safe Harbor, Trustees | 13 Comments

Investor Syndicate At Hundreds of Billions And Growing

Posted on June 16, 2010 by Isaac Gradman

Heard on this Street this week: the super-secret Syndicate of MBS Investors discussed previously is gaining momentum.  A confidential source has informed me that some of the largest institutional investors in mortgage-backed securities have now joined the group, bringing the amount … Continue reading →

Posted in Countrywide, firing servicers, Investor Syndicate, investors, irresponsible lending, litigation, loan files, MBS, repurchase, servicers | 2 Comments