$8.5 Billion BofA Settlement of Countrywide Trusts Raises Questions for Investors on Sidelines

As more details emerge about Bank of America’s proposed $8.5 billion settlement with Kathy Patrick’s bondholder group and Bank of New York Mellon (“BoNY”) as Trustee, the deal looks even worse for Countrywide RMBS investors.  Now, it is apparent that BofA is trying to settle all past and future repurchase and servicing claims with respect to all 530 Countrywide trusts, whether the involved bondholder group has standing in those trusts or not.  What’s even more apparent is that my original assessment of this effort was correct: the investors supporting this deal had conflicts of interest that prevented them from pursuing an aggressive settlement.

Here’s a quick summary of the key facts about this settlement, from what we know.  This information has been gleaned from the press release posted on the website of Kathy Patrick’s firm, Gibbs & Bruns, the press release issued by BofA, the Bank of New York settlement agreement, the separate settlement agreement with the 22 participating investors, and the investor call held by BofA this morning:

  • Settlement covers all 530 Countrywide trusts, that is, RMBS trusts issued by Countrywide itself;
  • Prominent investors involved include BlackRock, PIMCO, New York Life, New York Fed, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Prudential, Western Asset Management, MetLife, TIAA-CREF and the Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta (Freddie Mac is listed as a client of Kathy Patrick, but not as one of the 22 supporting investors);
  • Combined original unpaid principal balances of trusts at issue was $424 billion;
  • Current unpaid principal balances of trusts at issue is $221 billion;
  • $47 billion from these trusts has already gone into default;
  • Another $59 billion is severely delinquent;
  • $203 billion has been paid off;
  • The settlements release all rep and warranty (i.e., putback) claims for Countrywide RMBS bondholders, as well as all past and future servicing claims (so long as BofA services according to newly agreed-upon standards) and any chain of title claims;
  • The settlement proceeds of $8.5 billion will flow through the trust waterfalls to all investors, and be allocated to the trusts pro rata based on BoNY’s assessment of which have suffered the greatest losses; and
  • Because the settlement deals with potential claims under New York state law, a New York state court will have to approve the settlement.

It is important to note that there are several potential liabilities that are not covered by this settlement.  BofA stated in its investor call this morning that the settlement covers half of its private label exposure.  The other half includes things like:

  • Fraud and securities law claims with respect to Countrywide-issued RMBS;
  • All potential claims as to loans that Countrywide sold to third parties, which third parties then securitized them; and
  • All potential claims as to loans sold by other BofA entities (e.g., Merrill Lynch).

Thus, servicing and foreclosure documentation problems (i.e., the 50 State AG efforts) are still on the table.  The settlement also does not cover new repurchase claims submitted by Fannie Mae, which unlike Freddie Mac, did not release all future putback claims as part of its settlement with BofA at the beginning of this year.  As part of its announcement of this settlement, BofA stated that it will have to up its repurchase reserve for GSE claims because of the soft housing market and because GSE “behavior has changed,” as well as up its reserves for private label rep and warranty issues from an estimate of up to $10 bn at the end of 2010 and an estimate of up to $14 bn at the end of 1Q11, to an estimate of at least $19 billion for 2Q11.  Whether that number will continue to climb upwards depends, in large part, on whether the investors sitting on the sidelines step out of the shadows.

All of this leads me to the main point of this article: investors must — and, in my opinion, will — challenge this settlement as not in the interests of the majority of bondholders.  BoNY, which has filed the settlement petition in New York state court and will be advocating for its approval, has no financial interest in recovering additional money for investors.  In fact, it has a far greater economic incentive to keep BofA happy, as BofA has the potential to hire the bank for many more trustee gigs and other financial services roles in the future.  Further, BoNY has proven since the onset of the mortgage crisis to be one of the least cooperative trustees for investors, throwing up roadblock after roadblock to its having to work with investors to resolve putback issues.  This is likely why BofNY has so readily thrown its weight behind this settlement, which will allow it to end the back and forth with investors over all of its Countrywide deals (as far as I know, BofNY is the trustee on all Countrywide-issued RMBS deals).

Thus, outside investors cannot rely on the trustee to act as a fiduciary for its interests.  And there are several issues that investors will want to make sure the court considers.  As an initial matter, according to Kathy Patrick, the 22 investors involved have voting rights in only 502 out of the 530 trusts.  This means that they are releasing claims for 28 trusts in which they hold absolutely no interest (this is no small number – the $1.6 billion AGO settlement with BofA covered a portion of 29 RMBS trusts).

Second, the 22 investor group does not have 25% of the voting rights (the threshold to acquire standing to sue under most pooling and servicing agreements) in all of those 502 trusts.  Reuters reports that, in a May securities filing, BofA stated that these investors had standing in only 230 trusts.  I doubt very much that this number grew to more than 250 trusts in the last month.  Thus, the investors who negotiated this settlement lacked standing in over half the trusts affected by the deal.  Judge Barbara Kapnick, who has been assigned to review the proposed settlement, may find those sorts of facts important.  After all, she was the same judge who threw out Greenwich Financial’s lawsuit against Countrywide for failing to strictly adhere to the procedural requirements for standing contained in the PSAs at issue.

Third, even in the trusts where the investors own 25% of the voting rights, they do not necessarily hold at least 50% of those rights.  Thus, while they technically may have standing to sue for relief in those trusts, they can’t say that they necessarily represent the interests of the majority of bondholders.  This may help to persuade the judge that the objections of other investors should be carefully considered and given substantial weight.

Fourth, the court will have to weigh whether this settlement is reasonable in comparison to the amount of potential damages at issue.  To that end, it should take into account the deficiency rates in each of the trusts at issue and, given proper discounting for litigation risk, the time value of money, etc., whether $8.5 billion is a reasonable amount for investors to receive to give up all of those claims.  The press release issued by Kathy Patrick states that BofNY retained National Economic Research Associates (NERA) as its expert to estimate the size of the trusts’ potential repurchase claims.  But, I would be curious how many loans NERA sampled, how deep a dive it conducted, and what guidelines and exceptions standards it used to determine which loans breached reps and warranties.  I would guess that an investor-retained expert might find a significantly greater number of loans subject to repurchases.

Finally, the court will have to consider whether the trustee’s proposed methodology of allocating the settlement proceeds is reasonable.  Patrick’s press release makes a point of parroting BofA’s consistent refrain that, “not every loss suffered on a mortgage loan is the result of a Seller’s violation of a representation or warranty.”  Of course, as I’ve discussed many times in the past, the legal standard for determining whether a breach of rep and warranty engenders a repurchase is materiality, not causation, so this statement, while true, is besides the point.  Even so, if Patrick recognizes that losses are not a good proxy for breaches, then why are settlement proceeds being allocated exclusively based on the losses suffered by the trusts?  Why not base the allocation on the percentage of deficient loans found by NERA across each trust?  It’s likely because NERA didn’t sample loans in each trust.

Already, Reuters reports that many investors are hopping mad over this proposed deal (that same article contains a good summary of my thoughts on the potential challenges to this deal and why BofA has recently shifted its approach).  This report squares with the feedback I’ve received, including the assessment of one person familiar with these matters, who called the deal a “screw job” for investors.  This source estimated that the potential losses from defective loans in these deals (that is, loans eligible for repurchase) amounted to $100 bn, meaning investors were receiving about eight pennies for every dollar of their potential putback claims.  We agreed that, if that damages estimate was correct, a more reasonable settlement would be in the range of $25 to $50 bn.  Based on the fact that BAC’s stock price jumped 3.5% in after-hours trading once the deal was announced, the market seems to concur that this was a great deal for BofA.

As is the case with so many of the trends in mortgage crisis litigation, the fallout from this major development will depend on how quickly investors can organize, and how willing they will be to stand up and speak out about the losses they’re suffering at the hands of the banks and conflicted trustees.  But I agree with Bill Frey’s assessment, attributed to him in the Reuters article, that “the silver lining of the settlement offer is that it should force a resolution — either the majority of investors in the bonds at the center of settlement accept it, or they fight for a better deal.”

    Posted in allocation of loss, Bank of New York, banks, BlackRock, BofA, bondholder actions, chain of title, conflicts of interest, contract rights, Countrywide, damages, Federal Home Loan Banks, Federal Reserve, fiduciary duties, Freddie Mac, global settlement, Goldman Sachs, improper documentation, incentives, investors, irresponsible lending, Kathy Patrick, lawsuits, lenders, lending guidelines, liabilities, litigation, litigation costs, loss causation, loss estimates, MBS, MetLife, PIMCO, pooling agreements, private label MBS, procedural hurdles, putbacks, re-underwriting, rep and warranty, repurchase, responsibility, RMBS, securities, securitization, sellers and sponsors, settlements, standing, subprime, successor liability, The Subprime Shakeout, TIAA-CREF, Trustees, underwriting practices, valuation, waiver of rights to sue, William Frey | 17 Comments

    Breaking News: BofA Close to Reaching $8.5 bn Settlement with BlackRock, PIMCO (100th Post)

    As part of the Subprime Shakeout’s 100th Post (woo-hoo!), I bring you an analysis of some big, breaking news: today, the Wall Street Journal reported that Bank of America was closing in on an agreement with the investor group led by Kathy Patrick to pay $8.5 billion to settle claims over mortgage backed securities.  If true, this would be the largest MBS settlement to date arising out of the mortgage crisis.

    I first reported on this investor effort back in October 2010.  You can find my initial take here, a link to the demand letter sent by Patrick here, and a link to the response fired off by BofA here.  While we heard early in 2011 that the parties would extend all deadlines while they negotiated, we had heard very little about the progress of these efforts until today.

    While the details of the purported settlement are sketchy, the WSJ report states that the current investor group includes 22 institutions, including BlackRock, PIMCO, the New York Fed, MetLife and Freddie Mac, which collectively hold $56 billion worth of mid-2000s vintage MBS.  Though it did not report on any impending settlement, Bloomberg also published an article today on these negotiations, and stated that the value of the securities at issue was $84 billion, while the original principal value of the securities was $182 billion.  While it is not entirely clear how these numbers line up, my best guess is that the investor group holds approximately $56 billion of the $84 billion outstanding.

    What’s also unclear is how much of the reduction in the value of the bonds at issue is as a result of pay-downs and prepayments, and how much is as a result of the trusts taking losses on foreclosed properties.  Thus, it is difficult to assess what percentage of potential damages from investor claims is being born by BofA under the settlement.  My initial reaction is that, while the absolute dollar amount sounds large, this settlement is ultimately fairly small compared to the potential damages.

    This result would be consistent with the consensus among commentators regarding this investor group, including some of the comments contained in today’s Bloomberg article and my initial take on this effort: namely, the investors involved have significant other business dealings with BofA (a.k.a. conflicts), and thus would not seek an aggressive settlement.  At the same time, BofA has exhibited a growing interest in resolving its legacy RMBS liability, and thus would be interested in entering into a sweetheart settlement with a prominent group of investors that would set a precedential ceiling on future recoveries and discourage other investors from coming forward.

    Without seeing the terms of the settlement and the details of the group’s holdings, it’s impossible to know what claims are being released in this settlement and how the proceeds are to be shared.  For example, if the group is being paid outside of the trust waterfalls, and thus receiving the entire $8.5 billion, then the investors would actually be recovering much larger proportion of their potential damages (while potentially throwing the other investors who did not participate in the settlement under the bus, either by purporting to release their claims, or by making it impossible for those other investors to gain standing to sue).

    However, sources have indicated that the settlement funds will actually be paid into the trust waterfalls.  This would be ostensibly more equitable, in that all bondholders would be entitled to receive a share of the settlement proceeds, depending on their seniority.  However, query how equitable it really is for a portion of the bondholders (and most likely the senior portion, since these are primarily institutional investors) to set the settlement amount for the rest of the non-participating bondholders, and to receive the lion’s share of the benefits based on their more senior bond position.  Whether the investor group could or would engineer such a settlement remains to be seen.

    Regardless, the fact that these investors got any money at all out of the nation’s largest bank, let alone a material dollar amount, might actually encourage other investors to come forward.  A settlement of this size would reveal that BofA’s initial rhetoric, that it would fight these claims tooth and nail until they were forced to pay, was just that–empty rhetoric.  For example, BofA CEO Brian Moynihan stated during the company’s third quarter 2010 earnings call that, “we will go in and fight this.  It’s worked to our benefit to—we have thousands of people willing to stand and look at every one of these loans.”  Further, this settlement undermines BofA’s recent estimate that the cost of its legacy RMBS putback issues would not exceed $10 billion.  BofA cannot seriously assume that this is the only large investor group with which it will have to tangle over defective Countrywide loans.

    The simple truth is that investors have significant amounts of viable repurchase and Securities Act claims stemming from their purchase of Countrywide-issued or originated MBS, and BofA will be forced to confront many additional claims by investors in the coming years.  These additional investors might not have the same level of business dealings with BofA and thus might be willing to take more aggressive steps in pursuing reimbursement for its losses.  In that case, BofA’s strategy of creating a lowball settlement to discourage investors from coming forward might end up backfiring and further eroding the already strained capital on BofA’s balance sheet.

    Posted in allocation of loss, balance sheets, banks, BlackRock, BofA, bondholder actions, contract rights, Countrywide, damages, demand letter, Freddie Mac, investors, Kathy Patrick, lawsuits, liabilities, loss estimates, PIMCO, private label MBS, putbacks, RMBS, settlements | 3 Comments

    FDIC Sues LPS and CoreLogic Over Appraisal Fraud; Shows Investors Leaving Money on the Table

    In another sign that the Federal Government is turning its focus towards prosecuting the securitization players who may have contributed to the Mortgage Crisis, the FDIC filed separate lawsuits against LSI Appraisal (available here) and CoreLogic (available here) earlier this month.  In the suits, both filed in the Central District of California, the FDIC, as Receiver for Washington Mutual Bank (“WAMU”), accuses vendors with whom WAMU contracted to provide appraisal services of gross negligence, breach of reps and warranties, and other breaches of contract for providing defective and/or inflated appraisals.  The FDIC seeks at least $154 million from LSI (and its parent companies, including Lender Processing Services and Fidelity, based on alter ego liability) and at least $129 million from CoreLogic (and its parent companies, including First American Financial, based on alter ego liability).

    As we’ve been discussing on The Subprime Shakeout this past month, the U.S. Government has stepped up its efforts to pursue claims against originators, underwriters and other participants in mortgage securitization over irresponsible lending and underwriting practices that led to the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression.  This has included the DOJ suing Deutsche Bank over reckless lending and submitting improper loans to the FHA and the SEC subpoenaing records from Credit Suisse and JPMorgan Chase over so-called “double dipping” schemes.  The FDIC’s lawsuit is just the latest sign that much more litigation is on the horizon, as it focuses on yet another aspect of the Crisis that is ripe for investigation–appraisal fraud.

    Granted, those familiar with the loan repurchase or putback process have long recognized that inflated or otherwise improper appraisals are a major category of rep and warranty violations that are found in subprime and Alt-A loans originated between 2005 and 2007.  In fact, David Grais, in his lawsuits on behalf of the Federal Home Loan Banks of San Francisco and Seattle, focused the majority of his allegations against mortgage securitizers on inflated appraisals (ironically, the data Grais used in his complaints was compiled by CoreLogic, which is now one of the subjects of the FDIC’s suits).

    Grais likely zeroed in on appraisals in those cases because he was able to evaluate their propriety after the fact using publicly available data, as he had not yet acquired access to the underlying loan files that would have provided more concrete evidence of underwriting deficiences.  But, appraisals have been historically a bit squishy and subjective–even using retroactive appraisal tools–and absent evidence of a scheme to inflate a series of comparable properties, it can be difficult to convince a judge or jury that an appraisal that’s, say, 10% higher than you would expect was actually a negligent or defective assessment of value.

    The reason that the FDIC/WAMU is likely focusing on this aspect of the underwriting process is because it’s one of the few avenues available to WAMU to recover its losses.  Namely, the FDIC is suing over losses associated with loans that it holds on its books, not loans that it sold into securitization.  Though the latter would be a much larger set of loans, WAMU no longer holds any ownership interest in those loans, and would not suffer losses on that pool unless and until it (or its new owner, JPMorgan) were forced to repurchase a significant portion of those loans (read: a basis for more lawsuits down the road).

    Which brings me to the most interesting aspect of these cases.  As I mentioned, the FDIC is only suing these appraisal vendors over the limited number of loans that WAMU still holds on its books.  In the case against LSI, the FDIC only reviewed 292 appraisals and is seeking damages with respect to 220 of those (75.3%), for which it claims it found “multiple egregious violations of USPAP and applicable industry standards” (LSI Complaint p. 12).   Only 10 out of 292 (3.4%) were found to be fully compliant.  Yet, the FDIC notes earlier in that complaint that LSI “provided or approved more than 386,000 appraisals for residential loans that WaMu originated or purchased” (LSI Complaint p. 11).

    In the case against CoreLogic, the FDIC says that it reviewed 259 appraisals out of the more than 260,000 that had been provided (CoreLogic Complaint pp. 11-12).  Out of those, it found only seven that were fully compliant (2.7%), while 194 (74.9%) contained multiple egregious violations (CoreLogic Complaint p. 12).  And it was the 194 egregiously defective appraisals that the FDIC alleges caused over $129 million in damages.

    Can you see where I’m going with this?  If you assume that the rest of the appraisals looked very similar to those sampled by the FDIC, there’s a ton of potential liability left on the table.

    Just for fun, let’s just do some rough, back-of-the-envelope calculations to provide a framework for estimating that potential liability.  I will warn you that these numbers are going to be eye-popping, but before you get too excited or jump down my throat, please recognize that, as statisticians will no doubt tell you, there are many reasons why the samples cited in the FDIC’s complaints may not be representative of the overall population.  For example, the FDIC may have taken an adverse sample or the average size of the loans WAMU held on its balance sheet may have been significantly greater than the average size of the loans WAMU securitized, meaning they produced higher than average loss severities (and were also more prone to material appraisal inflation). Thus, do not take these numbers as gospel, but merely as an indication of the ballpark size of this potential problem.

    With that proviso, let’s project out some of the numbers in the complaints.  In the LSI/LPS case, the FDIC alleges that 75% of the appraisals it sampled contained multiple egregious violations of appraisal standards.  If we project that number to the total population of 386,000 loans for which LSI/LPS provided appraisal services, that’s 289,500 faulty appraisals.  The FDIC also claims it suffered $154 million in losses on the 220 loans with egregiously deficient appraisals, for an average loss severity of $700,000.  Multiply 289,500 faulty appraisals by $700,000 in losses per loan and you get a potential liability to LSI/LPS (on just the loans it handled for WAMU) of $202 billion.  Even if we cut the percentage of deficient appraisals in half to account for the FDIC’s potential adverse sampling and cut the loss severity in half to account for the fact that the average loss severity was likely much smaller (WAMU may have retained the biggest loans that it could not sell into securitizations), that’s still an outstanding liability of over $50 billion for LSI/LPS.

    Do the same math for the CoreLogic case and you get similar results.  The FDIC found 74.9% of the loans sampled had egregious appraisal violations, meaning that at least 194,740 of the loans that CoreLogic handled for WAMU may contain similar violations.  Since the 194 egregious loans accounted for $129 million in losses according to the Complaint, that’s an average loss severity of $664,948.  Using these numbers, CoreLogic thus faces potential liabilities of $129 billion.  Even using our very conservative discounting methodology, that’s still over $32 billion in potential liability.

    This means that somewhere out there, there are pension funds, mutual funds, insurance funds and other institutional investors who collectively have claims of anywhere from $82 billion to $331 billion against these two vendors of appraisal services with respect to WAMU-originated or securitized loans.  For how many other banks did LSI and CoreLogic provide similar services?  And how many other appraisal service vendors provided similar services during this time and likely conformed to what appear to have been industry practices of inflating appraisals?  The potential liability floating out there on just this appraisal issue alone is astounding, if the FDIC’s numbers are to be believed.

    The point of this exercise is not to say that the FDIC necessarily got its numbers right, or even to say that WAMU wasn’t complicit in the industry practice of inflating appraisals.  My point is that these suits reveal additional evidence that investors are sitting on massive amounts of potential claims, about which they’re doing next to nothing.  Where are the men and women of action amongst institutional money managers (and for that matter, who is John Galt?)?  Are they simply passive by nature, and too afraid of getting sued to even peek out from behind the rock? Maybe this is why investors don’t want to reveal their holdings in MBS – they’re afraid that if unions or other organized groups of pensioners realized that their institutional money managers held WAMU MBS and were doing nothing about it, they would sue these managers and/or never run their money through them again.

    The better choice, of course, would be to join the Investor Syndicate or one of the other bondholder groups that are primed for action, and then actually support their efforts to go after the participants in the largest Ponzi scheme in history (an upcoming article on TSS will focus on the challenges that these groups have faced in getting their members actually motivated to do something).  It seems that these managers should be focused on trying to recover the funds their investments lost for their constituents, rather than just acting to protect their own anonymity and their jobs.  If suits like those brought by the FDIC don’t cause institutional money managers to sit up and take notice, we have no other choice but to believe these individuals are highly conflicted and incapable of acting as the fiduciaries they’re supposed to be.  Of all the conflicts of interest that have been revealed in the fallout of the Mortgage Crisis, this last conflict would be the most devastating, because it would mean that the securitization participants who were instrumental in causing this crisis, and who were themselves wildly conflicted, will largely be let off the hook by those they harmed the most.

    Posted in allocation of loss, appraisals, causes of the crisis, Complaints, conflicts of interest, CoreLogic, FDIC, Federal Home Loan Banks, fiduciary duties, irresponsible lending, lawsuits, liabilities, loan files, loss causation, LPS, private label MBS, re-underwriting, rep and warranty, RMBS, statistical sampling, subprime, successor liability, underwriting practices, valuation, WaMu | Tagged , , , , | 2 Comments

    MBS Lawsuit Drivers Part II: Two More Reasons Why MBS Cases Should Jump in 2011

    by Josh Silverman, guest blogger

    Mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) litigation should expand this year, as Isaac Gradman correctly pointed out on The Subprime Shakeout in his Top 5 Reasons That MBS Lawsuits Are Just Beginning.   The sheer number of lawsuits continues to increase, and businesses that typically shy away from securities fraud litigation are now getting involved.  Even banks and insurers are starting to file MBS cases – including big names like Allstate, Dexia, Mass Mutual and the Federal Home Loan Banks of Boston, Seattle, San Francisco and Pittsburgh.

    After a rocky start, the law is getting better for MBS plaintiffs, too, at least in individual (non-class) actions.  The positive developments identified in Isaac’s post could embolden additional MBS investors to pursue legal remedies.

    But in my view the jump in individual MBS lawsuits is not due solely, or even primarily, to shifting sentiment.  Instead, many MBS investors are filing suit now because it may be their last chance to do so.  If they wait, good claims could expire, and downsized MBS class actions no longer give them cover to observe from the sidelines.  As described below, these two factors could be the primary drivers of an increase in MBS lawsuits this year.

    Expiring Statutes of Limitation

    All civil claims are subject to a limitations period, also called a statute of limitations.  These operate like a shot clock in sports, requiring plaintiffs to take action within a certain amount of time or lose forever the ability to seek recovery.

    Naturally, the best claims for MBS investors also have the shortest limitations period.  Claims under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 are widely considered to be the most pro-plaintiff causes of action in federal securities laws.  Plaintiffs bringing these claims do not have to prove the thorniest issues like intent, causation and reliance.   Instead, they only have to prove that the defendant made a material misrepresentation in a registration statement or prospectus (and for Section 12, that the defendant sold the MBS).  But Section 11 and 12 claims can currently only be brought within the earlier of one year after an investor discovered or should have discovered the fraud, or three years after the SEC filing in question (note that some legal commentators have argued that the longer statute of limitations of five years from the filing and two years from discovery, set forth in Sarbanes-Oxley, should apply to Section 11 and 12 claims that “sound in fraud”; however, courts have generally rejected that view).

    For all practical purposes, that means that Section 11 and 12 claims for MBS issued between 2005 and 2007 will be time-barred unless the limitations period was tolled (suspended).  Under federal law, the statute of limitations can sometimes be tolled when the plaintiff falls within the class definition of a pending class action.  However, this is one area where the law has not developed favorably for MBS investors.  Lower courts adopted a limited view of tolling in Wells Fargo, Countrywide, and other class action MBS cases.  Expect this issue to reach the appellate courts in 2011.

    Other types of claims have more generous limitations periods, but many are now on the brink of expiring.  A typical securities fraud claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 can be brought within two years of discovery, or no more than five years after the misrepresentations were made.  Fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims under state common law generally have a 2-5 year limitations period running from the discovery of the misrepresentation.

    These statutes of limitation will force undecided MBS investors off the fence.  Many will lose claims if they don’t act shortly.

    MBS Class Actions Get Smaller

    Shrinking MBS class actions may also spike the number of filings in 2011, as investors formerly covered by a class action find they have to proceed on their own.

    After the credit meltdown of 2008, class actions were filed against most major private-label MBS issuers.  These lawsuits included very broad class definitions, often covering several dozen or even hundreds of separate MBS securitizations.   An MBS investor included in one or more of these large classes might hold off filing its own lawsuit to see what level of recovery could be achieved in the class actions.

    But federal courts have since dramatically narrowed the majority of MBS class cases. Notwithstanding their broad class definitions, numerous decisions have limited class actions to the specific MBS securitizations owned by the named plaintiffs in those lawsuits.

    The impact has been profound.  Claims for 85 of the 94 MBS securitizations originally included in the Lehman Bros. MBS class action have been dismissed.  91 of 106 IndyMac MBS were pared from that class action.  And in the Countrywide MBS class action, an amended complaint filed in December dropped all but fourteen of the 427 Countrywide MBS once part of various class actions against that issuer.   MBS investors no longer part of these class actions can only obtain recovery by filing their own lawsuits.

    Between these two factors and the five reasons identified by Isaac, 2011 should be an active year for MBS filings.  Stay tuned…

    Josh Silverman is of counsel at Pomerantz Haudek Grossman & Gross LLP and a fan of The Subprime Shakeout.  Silverman exclusively represents investors in securities litigation and was co-lead counsel representing three multi-billion dollar state funds in a leading MBS case against Countrywide.  He welcomes your comments and can be reached by email at jbsilverman@pomlaw.com.  The ethics rules in his state require him to remind you that this post is not legal advice.

    Posted in Allstate, banks, bondholder actions, class actions, Countrywide, Federal Home Loan Banks, guest posts, IndyMac, lawsuits, litigation, MBS, mortgage fraud, private label MBS, securities, securities fraud, statutes of limitations | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

    Compass Point to Hold Follow-Up Call on Repurchase Risks

    Compass Point Research & Trading is hosting a conference call tomorrow, May 11 at 11:00 AM Eastern to discuss recent developments in mortgage repurchase litigation.  For those interested in participating, the call-in number is 877.641.0093.  Compass Point’s Jason Stewart will be the moderator on the call.

    A full version of the invitation is embedded below.  Compass’ last call and corresponding report from August 2010 garnered significant attention for its stark assessment of the potential repurchase liability facing the major banks and subprime lenders.

    I will again be a featured expert on this call, along with Richard Barrent, the President and COO of the Barrent Group.  We will be discussing following topics before taking Q&A from participants:

    • The current threshold that needs to be met in order to receive rescission ‐ does causation of default need to be proven?
    • What are the differences, if any, in success ratios of rescission requests by loan category?
    • A discussion of the Maine Retirement system ruling on the de facto merger of Countrywide and Bank of America (BAC—NC).
    • Will the inclusion of Bank of New York Mellon (NK—NC) in the Walnut Place lawsuit cause trustees and investors to work more
      closely together?
    • What are the different stages of resolution by investor category? Has the Bank of America (BAC—NC) and Assured Guaranty (AGO—
      NC) settlement changed the landscape?
    • Does some type of structured settlement make sense as the ultimate resolution?

    Based on the turnout for the last call and the media attention it received, I expect this call to be well-attended and feature some great questions and insights from the speakers and participants.  I will be available in the coming days for follow-up consultations on these topics, as well.  Hope to hear some readers of The Subprime Shakeout on the call tomorrow.  Looking forward to it!

    Private Label RMBS Litigation Conf Call(1)

    Posted in Compass Point, lawsuits, litigation, rep and warranty, repurchase, securitization, subprime | Leave a comment