Category Archives: moral hazard

Guest Post: The Migratory Patterns of Yield-Hungry Investors

Posted on April 12, 2012 by igradman

Editor’s Note: in this guest post, former bond insurance insider Steve Ruterman discusses important considerations for investing in private label MBS beyond credit risk analysis, including how investors can benefit from understanding the differences in servicer behavior and business models.  … Continue reading →

Posted in Attorneys General, bondholder actions, conflicts of interest, firing servicers, foreclosure rate, guest posts, hedge funds, incentives, investors, junior liens, loan modifications, loan seasoning, MBIA, MBS, moral hazard, mortgage market, pre-investment due diligence, private label MBS, projecting risk adjusted returns, putbacks, regulation, Regulators, servicer defaults, servicer reports, servicers, subprime | Leave a comment

Is Foreclosure Settlement Déjà Vu All Over Again?

Posted on February 9, 2012 by igradman

Today, the Attorneys General of 49 states (with Oklahoma being the lone holdout) announced a record $26 billion settlement with the nation’s five largest servicers over false and fraudulent foreclosure practices like robosigning.  That big number looks great on paper, … Continue reading →

Posted in allocation of loss, Attorneys General, bailout, banks, BofA, consitutionality, contract rights, costs of the crisis, Countrywide, education, foreclosure crisis, global settlement, Government bailout, Greenwich Financial Services, Helping Families Save Homes, homeowner relief, improper documentation, incentives, investigations, investors, irresponsible lending, junior liens, lenders, liabilities, loan modifications, lobbying, MBS, media coverage, moral hazard, mortgage market, predatory lending, press, private label MBS, probes, public perceptions, Regulators, RMBS, robo-signers, securitization, Servicer Safe Harbor, servicers, settlements, sophistication, subprime, Takings Clause, The Subprime Shakeout, Way Too Big to Fail, William Frey, workouts | 13 Comments

Treasury Official Speaks Out About Excessive Risk Taking

Posted on October 24, 2009 by Isaac Gradman

At long last, someone in Washington is speaking out about the dangerous precedent set by the government bailouts of major banks. As discussed in this article on the financial regulations website FinReg21, Treasury secretary Michael Barr testified before the House … Continue reading →

Posted in bailout, executive compensation, Fannie Mae, Federal Reserve, Freddie Mac, Government bailout, incentives, Judiciary Committee, Lehman Brothers, Michael Barr, moral hazard, too big to fail, Treasury | Leave a comment