Mortgage Lit Roundup: Five Signs That Plaintiffs Are Winning the RMBS War

A lot can happen in a few months.  I’ve largely taken a break from blogging over the last quarter, as the demands of becoming a new father and joining a new law firm (see “Legal Practice” link in the header) have kept my plate plenty full.  But of course the world of mortgage litigation takes no breaks, and in fact things have been heating up in a big way over the last few months in the lawsuits over soured mortgage backed securities.

While the mainstream media has seemed to tire a bit of this story over the last year, in part as a result of the lack of headline-grabbing criminal prosecutions or dramatic case resolutions, it is just now starting to return to the topic in a big way.  Notably, the New York Times made waves with a story last week about the toll this litigation is taking on banks’ balance sheets – something folks like Manal Mehta and yours truly have been talking about and predicting for years.

Nevertheless, I can’t help but agree that we’re reaching a critical point of reckoning in the arc of post-crisis litigation – the inflection point at which banks can stall no longer and must either acknowledge the true cost of their and their affiliates’ irresponsible lending or risk trials and adverse judgments.  Importantly, we are beginning to see clear victors emerge in the litigation battles that had been raging in board rooms and court rooms over the last four years.  This, in turn has forced banks to launch flank attacks at some of their most ardent litigation counterparties.  In the face of these efforts, I’ve compiled my top five signs that this war of attrition is tilting in favor of RMBS plaintiffs.

Sign No. 5: Walnut Place (Baupost) Back from the Dead

This past summer, I started hearing rumblings that investors were packing it in, cashing in their chips and giving up on RMBS litigation.  The poster child for this theory was The Baupost Group hedge fund, also known by its litigation alias Walnut Place, which had been among the most vocal objectors to the $8.5 billion global settlement between Bank of New York and Bank of America over Countrywide RMBS.  After suffering the disheartening dismissal of its claims against BofA at the hands of Judge Kapnick, and the confirmation of that dismissal by the New York appellate court, Walnut Place withdrew its objections to the global settlement and soon began offloading its positions in Countrywide bonds.

However, it turns out that rumors of the fund’s demise in the world of RMBS litigation were greatly exaggerated.  On September 4, the Law Debenture Trust Co. of New York, as trustee for a Bear Stearns RMBS trust, filed an amended complaint against Bear Stearns lending unit EMC (now owned by JP Morgan), demanding that it buy back more than 1,000 loans that allegedly breached one or more reps and warranties.  A status report filed prior to the filing of the Amended Complaint (available here courtesy of Reuters) identified the Ashford Square Entities, wholly owned subsidiaries of Baupost, as the owners of 50.4% of the Trust and the representative of the certificateholders who are directing the trustee.

What’s interesting about this filing (redline version available here), is that it’s direct evidence of a development I’ve predicted for some time – that discovery obtained by the monolines in their more advanced litigation against the banks would embolden bondholders and provide them with a treasure trove of ammunition to use in their own lawsuits.  Indeed, Baupost’s Amended Complaint now includes allegations of a fraudulent “double-dipping” scheme at EMC/Bear Stearns/JPMorgan that first appeared in a lawsuit by Ambac against EMC back in January 2011 (these allegations have now popped up elsewhere, as we will see later in this post).

This is the first bondholder suit of which I’m aware to include these charges, as the Amended Complaint notes that discovery obtained in other suits against EMC shows a pattern of denying investor repurchases while seeking compensation from third party originators for the very same defects.  On top of that, the Amended Complaint contains the detailed results of an extensive file review of the loans at issue, revealing that well over 80% of the loans in the Trust were found to materially breach reps and warranties, and laying out some of most egregious underwriting errors.   Though BofA has born the brunt of mortgage litigation attacks over the past couple of years, JP Morgan is beginning to hear the drum beat of an RMBS army advancing in its direction.

Sign No. 4: Regulators (Finally) Jump Into the Fray

It has certainly been a long time coming, but it appears that regulators are finally starting to take discernible steps towards bringing accountability to at least some of those who contributed to the mortgage crisis.

As most are aware, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed a lawsuit against JP Morgan on October 1 that was premised on the same double dipping conduct by Bear Stearns and EMC that was the subject of Ambac’s Amended Complaint in January 2011.  The lawsuit was touted in a DOJ press release as “the first legal action from the RMBS Working Group.” It accused JP Morgan of two claims under New York law: securities fraud under Article 23-A of the Martin Act (the General Business Law) and persistent fraud or illegality under Section 63(12) of the Executive Law.

Schneiderman also announced that he hoped this case would be a “template for future actions” against other players in the securitization market, sending a signal that this would be the first of several lawsuits on this topic.  On November 20, Schneiderman made good on this promise, suing Credit Suisse over similar charges related to a fraudulent double dipping scheme.  The similarity of these two lawsuits is striking – and I’m not sure if this is more a result of Schneiderman using the JP Morgan action as a literal template (he has been accused of using a cut-and-paste style of lawyering) or the fact that the big banks tend to engage in the same exact types of fraud at the same times (but if you listen to the bank defenses in the LIBOR cases, “rogue traders” came up with all of the same brilliantly fraudulent schemes independently and without any collusion of any sort, and certainly without the knowledge or participation of upper management).

Most commentators who have written about these filings have been largely critical, and I have my own gripes, so I’ll get those out of the way first.  Primarily, I’m disappointed by the fact that the allegations in the complaints (here are links to the complaints against JP Morgan and Credit Suisse, so you can view them for yourself) are essentially carbon copies of those leveled by Ambac and other bond insurers against EMC and JP Morgan, and those leveled against Credit Suisse by MBIA, respectively, allegations that were first made nearly two years ago.  I would have thought that with all of the subpoena and investigative powers that the RMBS Working Group purportedly had at its fingertips, it would have had something to add to the evidence that private plaintiffs had already obtained through ordinary discovery.

If they weren’t going to add anything of their own, then why did it take the Working Group two years to file its first complaint?  Waiting until a month before the election likely had political benefits, but the running of the statute of limitations has cost the AG the ability to go after conduct occurring prior to 2006.

Moreover, I’m disappointed that these are entirely civil complaints, meaning that more than four years after the onset of this crisis, we still have seen no criminal charges brought against players who contributed to the mortgage meltdown.  As I have said repeatedly, only criminal charges against firms or individuals would truly deter this sort of complex financial fraud and prevent firms from simply “pricing in” civil penalties into the cost of doing business.  The complaint does not even bring any civil claims against individuals, even further guaranteeing that no decisionmakers will feel any real pain from this suit.

Finally, the suits appear to have been brought entirely under the auspices of the NYAG’s office, featuring only claims under New York law and taking advantage of none of the federal powers to which Schneiderman was reported to have access.  If Schneiderman really wanted to demonstrate the power and support that his Working Group carried, he likely would have preferred to list the DOJ as a co-plaintiff.

All complaining aside, however, I have to say that I was gratified to see that these complaints were filed at all.  After months of seeing little activity from the RMBS Working Group, we finally have something to point to as a sign that regulators really do give a hoot about the massive fraud that was and continues to be perpetrated against institutional investors, insurance funds and taxpayers in connection with mortgage bonds.  Rather than focusing on a symptom of the bigger problem, such as the both-sides-of-the-deal type allegations that the SEC brought against JP Morgan, Goldman, Citigroup and others for selling their clients collateralized debt obligations (securitizations of other securitized assets) as they became aware of the collapsing house of cards, this lawsuit focuses on the heart of the problem – the sale and securitization of knowingly defective loans on which the subprime securities were built.

This is an important development because it gives credence to all the private lawsuits surrounding this conduct, showing that third party regulators consider the banks’ conduct to have been illegal and worthy of their attention.  This provides private litigants with the political cover to continue their existing legal battles and bring new actions, while also promising to uncover additional evidence to aid in those pursuits.

Finally, this action encourages other regulators to jump on the RMBS litigation bandwagon or risk looking like wallflowers while more active agencies gain positive publicity and potential returns for their constituents.  We’ve already seen some evidence of that last point.  On October 9, the Manhattan U.S. Attorney, in conjunction with HUD, sued Wells Fargo Corp. over allegations of falsely certifying mortgages that were federally insured.  This comes on the heels of similar suits against CitiMortgage, Flagstar, Deutsche Bank, and Allied Home Mortgage.

While not an entirely novel type of suit, the tone of the fraud allegations against Wells Fargo and the fact that they extend to Wells’ alleged fraudulent cover-up when faced with subpoena, suggest an increasingly aggressive campaign by the DOJ.  This was later confirmed when U.S. Attorney Preet Bharaha, on behalf of the DOJ, filed a civil fraud complaint against Countrywide and BofA on October 24, seeking over $1 billion in damages for systematically deceiving the GSEs about the loans it was selling to them, and then refusing to honor contractual obligations to repurchase defective loans.  This is by far the most aggressive legal action taken by the DOJ to date with respect to improper origination practices.

In addition, regulators responsible for conserving the assets of failed institutions have become more active in recent months.  On August 10, the FDIC sued a dozen banks over misrepresentations in the offerings of $388 million in securities sold to the failed Colonial Bank.  Apart from attorney’s fees and court expenses, this lawsuit seeks $189 million in damages.  On August 21, the FDIC sued Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, BofA, Deutsche Bank and Ally Financial’s Residential Funding Securities LLC in three separate lawsuits in Texas over misrepresentations in the offerings of $5.4 billion of securities sold to the failed Guaranty Bank.  These three suits seek over $2 billion in damages.

The National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”), a federal regulator that supervises and insures the nation’s credit unions, was forced to step in as conservator for five credit unions that failed in 2009-10 due in large part to their massive RMBS holdings.  Having been saddled with approximately $50 billion in battered RMBS from these institutions, the NCUA proceeded to take aggressive legal action with respect to certain issuers of private label RMBS, beginning with lawsuits against Royal Bank of Scotland, Goldman Sachs, and J.P. Morgan in June, July and August 2011, respectively.  Several more suits followed over the next year.

The NCUA later became the first regulator to recover losses on behalf of failed banking institutions when it settled three such suits – against Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and HSBC – to the tune of $170 million.  Since September 2012, the agency has now filed three additional lawsuits on behalf of now-defunct credit unions, including a suit against Credit Suisse surrounding alleged misrepresentations in the sale of $715 million worth of RMBS, a suit against Barclays over the sale of $555 million in RMBS, and a suit against UBS over the sale of $1.1 billion in RMBS.  At last count, the NCUA had nine lawsuits pending against various issuers of RMBS securities on behalf of failed federal credit that collectively paid $8.45 billion for the bonds.

If regulators acting on behalf of failed institutions feel compelled to bring actions to recover losses associated with MBS, you would think we’d see more such lawsuits from private institutions.  But, alas, agent-principal conflicts and political considerations prevent more investors from becoming active litigants.  Still, the recent actions by regulators show that the private investors who have sued are making headway, and they’re now gaining political cover and additional ammunition that can only help their efforts.

Sign No. 3 – Smoke Meet Gun

Establishing a claim of civil fraud requires knowing misrepresentation, made with the intent to mislead, on which the intended target reasonably relies to its detriment.  As I have been quick to point out, without smoking gun evidence that shows knowledge of falsity and intent to mislead, it is incredibly hard to prove civil fraud in a court of law.  Though the double dipping charges discussed above certainly suggest bad faith on the part of the banks, they don’t necessarily fall squarely into this tight definition of fraud.  With the latest lawsuit by MBIA, however, I think plaintiffs have found the smoke for their guns.

On September 14, MBIA sued JP Morgan (as successor to Bear Stearns) over conduct that, if proven, can only be described as blatant fraud.  MBIA accuses Bear of duping the bond insurer to provide financial guaranty insurance for a GMAC securitization by showing it a doctored due diligence report that concealed the true rate of defects in the deal’s loans.

I have heard whispers about this type of conduct for years, but no evidence had ever emerged publically to back it up.  It was common industry practice for issuers to provide potential insurers with a supposedly independent due diligence report provided by a third party, like Clayton or Bohan.  This report, evaluating the conformance of a sample of loans to the governing laws, contracts and underwriting guidelines, was supposed to provide the insurer with an accurate picture of the risk of the underlying loan pool, allowing it to gain comfort with accepting and pricing the risk.

However, as MBIA now alleges, it ultimately learned that the report it was shown by the issuer had been “scrubbed” or doctored, and the adverse findings had been deleted from the report before it was turned over to the insurer.  How did MBIA find this out?  It got the original due diligence report from Mortgage Data Management Corporation.  By comparing the findings in both, MBIA was able to discover that 50 columns of adverse findings in the spreadsheet had simply been removed by Bear Stearns to make the loans appear far rosier.  If this isn’t evidence of blatant civil (and criminal) fraud, I don’t know what is.  Prosecutors looking to make a name for themselves, take notice (and if you’re looking for individuals to prosecute, how about the person who went into the document to delete the adverse findings, as well as the manager that instructed this person to do so?).

The important takeaway from this case is that it further erodes the “global catastrophe” defense that banks have been hiding behind for years – that they had no knowledge of how the market would turn, and that it was this unforeseen catastrophe of housing price collapse, unemployment and credit crunches that caused these deals to fail, not anything they could have controlled.  This evidence of scrubbing shows that banks were well aware of how poor these loans were underwritten (and thus how likely they were to fail), and shouldn’t be able to have that conduct whitewashed by the crisis that followed.  Though the mantra of Wall St. may have been to make sure some other patsy was holding the bag when the music stopped, the law allows these transactions to be reversed in certain situations.  And when that unsuspecting third party can show that someone went into a spreadsheet, erased problematic findings of an independent due diligence provider, and then passed the report of as authentic, that third party has as good a chance as any of winning in court.

Sign No. 2 – We Finally Have a Trial

As I mentioned above, the mainstream press seemed to grow tired of RMBS litigation news of the last year due to the slow pace of these lawsuits.  More than four years after their filing, many were still winding their way through discovery and motions for summary judgment, and no trials or dramatic resolutions were available to report.  That all changed this fall, when bond insurer Assured Guaranty went to trial against Flagstar seeking $116 million in a case over soured RMBS in the Southern District of New York.

Presiding over the trial was Judge Jed Rakoff, who should be familiar to readers of the Subprime Shakeout for his outspoken opinions and willingness to challenge both regulators and the big banks over their handling of the mortgage backed securities problem.  And if Rakoff’s reputation didn’t make Flagstar nervous heading into a bench trial, the opinion Hizzoner issued just before trial certainly should have.  Though he had denied Flagstar’s motion for summary judgment back in February, he issued his explanation for this ruling in September, and it was a godsend for RMBS plaintiffs.

I’ve written extensively about the banks’ most important and oft-repeated defense — that there were intervening causes that were responsible for the damages investors and insurers suffered, and those plaintiffs must prove that their losses were directly caused by poor underwriting.  Every judge to have reviewed this issue has ruled that this was not the case — plaintiffs must only show that poor underwriting increased their risk, not that it led directly to default.

However, these opinions had been limited to the bond insurance context.  Though Rakoff’s was similar, and he explicitly noted that he agreed with Judge Crotty’s analysis from Syncora v. EMC, the logic of Rakoff’s opinion could much more readily extend to investor putbacks. Rakoff’s primary holding, similar to prior holdings on this topic, was that Assured “must only show that the breaches materially increased its risk of loss. Put another way, the causation that must here be shown is that the alleged breaches caused plaintiff to incur an increased risk of loss.”  But in support of this holding, Rakoff noted that:

the Transaction Documents do not mention “cause,” “loss” or “default” with respect to the defendants’ repurchase obligations. If the sophisticated parties had intended that the plaintiff be required to show direct loss causation, they could have included that in the
contract, but they did not do so, and the Court will not include that language now “under the guise of interpreting the writing.” (Rakoff Summary Judgment Opinion at 11-12 (citations omitted))

By focusing on the language in the pooling and servicing agreements – the same language to which investors will look to assert their own repurchase claims – rather than solely on the “interests” of the party asserting the claim, Rakoff has given bondholders a large hook on which to hang their hats when they reach this stage of their lawsuits (which are about two years behind bond insurer suits).  More immediately, Rakoff has given Flagstar and Assured an indication that he’s not buying the bank’s defenses.

This indication was only further confirmed by the trial itself, which was simply fascinating (at least to me).  Because this was a bench trial, meaning that the case was not tried before a jury and Judge Rakoff was the sole factfinder, Rakoff had broad latitude to insert himself into the trial proceedings, and he took advantage.  Repeatedly throughout the trial, Rakoff interrupted counsel presentations or questioning of witnesses to ask his own questions and point out inconsistencies he found in the loan documents.

One example, discussed at length by commentators, including Alison Frankel here, was when Rakoff questioned Flagstar’s underwriting manager regarding a borrower who listed himself as both a Detroit police officer and the president of a mortgage broker.  Rakoff expressed extreme skepticism about whether it was plausible that this individual held both jobs, and whether he should have received a loan at all.

Though Rakoff had chosen this loan at random from a pool of 20 loans being reviewed at trial, in my experience, it was more an example that proved the rule than an anomaly.  What I found when I began coordinating reviews of subprime and Alt-A loans for clients at the outset of the Mortgage Crisis was that the overwhelming majority had no business being made, and you couldn’t throw a dart at these loan files without finding a red flag.  It was based on this experience that I concluded that investors had hundreds of billions of dollars worth of valid putback claims on their hands, if only they had the intestinal fortitude to pursue them.

I also had experience presenting these sorts of underwriting defects to mediators during attempts to settle mortgage putback cases on behalf of mortgage insurance clients.  These mediators were often retired judges with no experience evaluating mortgage backed securities or underwriting guidelines, but all had expertise in evaluating contracts.  It was thus relatively simple to educate them about the meaning of representations and warranties in the trust agreements, and all came away agreeing that, were they to have to make a ruling, they would agree that the overwhelming majority of our adverse findings constituted material rep and warranty breaches.  It does not surprise me that Rakoff, a seasoned and well-respected jurist, would have little trouble finding blatant underwriting defects in the subject loan files.

Even more striking was the straightforward manner in which Rakoff cut through the continued efforts of Flagstar to frame the claims in a backward-looking, results-oriented manner based on the borrower’s payment or employment history post-origination.   Manal Mehta of Sunesis Capital highlights the following three passages as directly debunking the banks’ logic for their minimal private label putback reserves:

THE COURT:  I don’t understand the relevance of what the witness just said at all.  At the time the borrower applies to the bank for the loan, there is no way of knowing whether he’s going to be paying for the next three years or not, so you have to assess the risk as it stands at the moment of application, true?

***

THE COURT:  The information that was available at the time was that, in fact, it appeared that he had substantially misrepresented his income, and his income was less, considerably less than he had represented, yes?

***

THE COURT:  But I am still missing the point.  It is true, of course, that someone who may have made all sorts of misrepresentations on their loan application may still wind up paying the mortgage for a while.  They may have hit the lottery or they may have a relative who helped them out or a hundred other possibilities.  But the relevant thing is, in assessing risk, is the risk at the time the loan was approved, yes?

From my perspective, Rakoff has nailed it.  The reps and warranties made by originators and issuers were made as of the date the securitization trust closed and the securities were sold to investors.  The question is whether a reasonable underwriter using an objective methodology should have found that the borrower was likely to repay the mortgage.  Whether the borrower ultimately paid is immaterial – underwriting is all about trying to control the risk at the outset.  In other words, even a blind underwriter can sometimes find a bone (a risky borrower who actually does repay the mortgage), but that doesn’t mean it was acceptable for him or her to ignore underwriting guidelines just to push more loans through to closing.

Insurance companies, like investors, had a right to rely on the loan origination process that was represented in the contracts and offering documents.  The abandonment of that process, in and of itself, entitles these aggrieved parties to recover, regardless of whether borrowers made one payment or 60.

Thus, it seems likely that Rakoff is going to come back with a sledge hammer of a ruling against Flagstar on the merits of Assured’s putback claims.  And though he did not rule directly on this issue, based on the way the trial proceeded with a focus on a small pool of 20 loans, it appears that Rakoff will allow summary evidence to be presented as a proxy for the remaining 15,000 loans in the pool (a.k.a. sampling).  If he does, this will  be the biggest nail yet in the coffin of the banks’ loan-by-loan defense.

Sign No. 1 – BofA Resorts to Flank Attacks

Readers of this blog know that one of the cases I’ve been covering in the most depth, and the one that will likely have the biggest impact on handicapping legacy RMBS exposure, is MBIA v. Countrywide, BofA.  As one of the earliest-filed RMBS cases, and featuring two of the strongest legal teams on either side in an all-out bet-the-company litigation, this case has generated important rulings in every major facet of securitization case law.

Now in its fourth year of litigation, the case has finally reached the last pleading hurdle before trial, and each side has presented two motions for summary judgment – one on Countrywide’s liability for fraud and breach of contract, and one on Bank of America’s liability as a successor-in-interest to Countrywide.  Hearings on these motions began last week, with MBIA’s attorney, Philippe Selendy, from the New York office of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, raising eyebrows by announcing in court that at least $12.7 billion in Countrywide loans were materially defective.

I could write an entire article about the arguments raised in these motions, and how they’re likely to play out, but I will leave that for another day.  The long and short of it is that neither side is likely to knock out the other side’s case in summary judgment, and while the issues may be narrowed significantly by Judge Bransten, we are going to see a trial in this case if it doesn’t settle first.

Apparently sensing this, BofA has begun leaning even more heavily on a strategy of flank attacks against MBIA, turning the dispute between the parties into a conflagration of all-out corporate warfare.  This, to me, is the most important takeaway from the latest developments in this case – the indication from BofA that it doesn’t believe it can win on the papers or knock out MBIA’s legal claims head on.

We’ve already seen some of this in the battle between the parties.  BofA has emerged as the leader in a consortium of banks that sued MBIA and the New York Insurance Department in separate cases over MBIA’s transformation, hoping to unwind that transaction and push the parent to the brink of insolvency.  Though we’re approaching six months and counting since the conclusion of the merits hearing in the first transformation case (the Article 78 proceeding before Judge Kapnick), my initial assessment still holds: that BofA is unlikely to obtain a victory at this stage, as the judge is obligated to give broad deference to the Insurance Commissioner’s decision to approve MBIA’s transformation.

But this has not stopped the nation’s former number one bank from trying to squeeze the monoline six ways from Sunday.  The latest skirmish began when MBIA announced that it was seeking to change the terms governing almost $900 million of bonds, to eliminate cross-default provisions that would allow bondholders to immediately demand payment from the parent company if MBIA Insurance was seized by regulators.  In layman’s terms, MBIA was seeking to shore up the parent by isolating the insurance company and preventing the troubled subsidiary from dragging the parent down with it.  Of course, if you believe MBIA, the insurance company is only in trouble because BofA refuses to buy back the defective loans that it duped MBIA into insuring.

Of course, BofA wasn’t about to let MBIA get away with this.  So, BofA came back with a tender off of its own – seeking to buy $329 million worth of MBIA bonds to block the insurer’s efforts.  BofA justified the move by saying that if the insurer succeeded with its consent solicitation, “the risk of MBIA Insurance Corporation being placed in rehabilitation or liquidation will increase, which would jeopardize all policyholder claims, including Bank of America’s.”

MBIA’s request to bondholders was accompanied by an offer to pay $10 per $1,000 of notes to those who consented.  Meanwhile, in its counter offer, BofA offered to pay bondholders as much as a 22 percentage point premium on bonds governed by one of two indentures MBIA was trying to amend.  MBIA’s stock went on a roller coaster that week, as theses various developments played out.

Ultimately, MBIA announced that it was successful in its consent solicitation but that didn’t stop BofA from purchasing $136 million worth of MBIA bonds, anyway.  Christian Herzeca posted a couple of great articles on his blog (available here and here) regarding the strategy (or lack thereof) behind this move by the banking giant.

Herzeca’s takeaway was that BofA was gearing up to settle with MBIA, and was gathering assets that they could wrap up into an eventual settlement to cloud the bottom line dollar amount (a la the Syncora Settlement).  I tended to think that BofA was gearing up for the opposite – a long, drawn out battle to the death, in which they were gathering any tools they could use to put pressure on MBIA to cave cheaply.

Well, we didn’t need to linger in suspense for long.  This past Friday, BofA sued MBIA yet again, claiming that the insurer had tortiously interfered with BofA’s tender offer to buy MBIA bonds.  Yes, that’s right – BofA tried to block MBIA’s consent solicitation, and when that failed, it sued MBIA for tortiously interfering with BofA’s attempted tender offer.  It goes without saying that there is no love lost between these companies, but their escalating battle is starting to take on a certain Through the Looking Glass kind of flavor.

What I read from these shenanigans is that MBIA is trying to buy some time to see its putback litigation against BofA through to completion.  It realizes that every day that goes by without obtaining any of the recoveries it booked from this litigation makes the insurance subsidiary’s balance sheet look that much weaker, and thus at greater risk of intervention from regulators.  BofA also knows this, which is why the bank’s primary strategy is to drag out these recoveries as long as possible, hoping that liquidity pressure and/or pressure from regulators will force MBIA to settle otherwise ironclad claims at pennies on the dollar. And since this case is such a widely-watched bellwether, a cheap settlement here sets the ceiling for the torrent of other putback litigation BofA is beating back.

By amending the cross-default provisions in its bonds, MBIA is basically saying, we’re not afraid to go down with this ship.  We are betting the company (at least the insurance subsidiary) on this putback litigation, and we will litigate as long as we have to in order to get the recoveries we deserve.  BofA apparently felt this move was dangerous enough that it was willing to launch it’s own tender offer, and then file a lawsuit when they lost, in an attempt to undo the amendment MBIA achieved. This, in turn, means that MBIA has exposed BofA’s litigation strategy for what it is, and has come up with an effective plan of attack.

When all is said and done, watching these elaborate corporate machinations play out is somewhat gratifying, because it confirms a hypothesis I formed over four years ago when I first began covering this litigation: that these insurer and investor putback claims were so strong, and based on such powerful and extensive evidence of irresponsible lending in the pre-crisis loan files, that the banks had no viable defense.  Nor could the banks acknowledge the liability because the magnitude of the potential payouts could reveal the banks to be insolvent.  Therefore, the only logical response was for the banks to try to drag out the recoveries as long as they could (the “loan-by-loan” strategy), and to try to earn their way out of this problem.  Nothing I have seen in four years since has persuaded me otherwise; instead, this flurry of collateral attacks by Bank of America has only convinced me that my assessment was spot on.

One of the main purposes of the rule of law and the civil justice system is to redistribute losses in a socially expedient manner.  It’s just too bad that the wheels of justice grind so slowly that aggrieved parties can run the risk of going bankrupt before they can recover what they’re owed.

Epilogue

I don’t mean to paint an overly rosy picture of RMBS litigation and imply that there have been no adverse decisions for RMBS plaintiffs.  Certainly, we’ve seen a few oddball decisions that have limited recoveries where financial guaranty insurers continued to accept premiums after realizing there were breaches in the pools, or limiting putback recoveries to loans that had not yet been charged off, but as I will explain in future posts, these non-binding decisions are largely idiosyncratic and difficult to justify in any logical manner.  For that reason, they are unlikely to be seen as persuasive by the other judges who are wrestling with these cases.  Instead, the overwhelming majority will go the way that Bransten, Pauley, Crotty, and Rakoff have gone thus far, and conclude that even in Wonderland, the banks can’t escape the inevitable conclusion that they’re on the hook for the shoddy mortgages they sold.

Hat tips to Manal Mehta, Deontos, Alison Frankel and Sari Krieger for keeping me up-to-date on many of these developments.

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Upcoming Presentation: Trends in MBS Litigation

I am pleased to announce that I will be speaking in and presenting at an upcoming Strafford live phone/web seminar, “Mortgage-Backed Securities Litigation: Latest Developments” scheduled for tomorrow, Thursday, November 15, 1:00pm-2:30pm EST. This will be largely geared towards attorneys (CLE credit available), but should have relevance for anyone participating in or following MBS litigation, so I thought this might be of particular interest to the readers of this blog.  Plus, as a reader of The Subprime Shakeout, you are eligible to attend this seminar at 50% off (note: the author derives no compensation for participating in or promoting this seminar). There is a link at the bottom of this post that will automatically give the discount to anyone interested in participating.

The following is a description of the subject matter to be covered:

The credit crisis and multi-billion dollar write-down of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) have spawned suits by investors against issuers and underwriters alleging securities fraud, contractual claims and claims of misrepresentation.  In addition to individual suits, investors have initiated class actions.

Recent federal and state court rulings have sharpened substantive and procedural issues, although many issues remain to be addressed. Settlement announcements have accelerated and may shape the course of ongoing cases.  My fellow panelist, James Goldfarb, and I will update counsel on recent trends involving residential and commercial MBS suits and outline approaches to prepare for the complexities involved in representing the various stakeholders.

We will offer our perspectives and guidance on these and other critical questions:

  • What are the bases for suits regarding MBS?
  • What challenges do plaintiffs’ counsel face in pursuing MBS claims?
  • What challenges do defendants’ counsel face in defending MBS claims?
  • How will recent and pending rulings in individual and class actions impact MBS litigation?
  • What are the most recent developments in settlement of MBS suits?

After our presentations, James and I will engage in a live question and answer session with participants — so we can answer your questions about these important issues directly.

I hope to hear from some of you tomorrow.

Follow this link or more information or to register at half price, call 1-800-926-7926 ext. 10 (ask for Mortgage-Backed Security Litigation on 11/15/12 and mention code: ZDFCT)

 

Posted in bondholder actions, broader credit crisis, class actions, Complaints, conflicts of interest, contract rights, costs of the crisis, counterparty risk, damages, derivative lawsuits, discovery, education, fraud, gatekeeper litigation, global catastrophe defense, global settlement, impact of the crisis, investors, irresponsible lending, Judicial Opinions, jury trials, lawsuits, liabilities, litigation, loss causation, MBS, misrespresentation, monoline actions, pooling agreements, Presentations, private label MBS, putbacks, rep and warranty, repurchase, research, responsibility, RMBS, securities, securities laws, securitization, sellers and sponsors, settlements, standing, statistical sampling, statutes of limitations, summary judgment, The Subprime Shakeout, Trustees, underwriting practices | 1 Comment

Investor End Games: All Is Not Well in the Garden

“As long as the roots are not severed, all is well.  And all will be well in the garden.”

- Chance the Gardener, Being There (1979)

With Judge Barbara Kapnick announcing earlier this month that the approval hearing in Bank of New York Mellon’s (BNYM) proposed $8.5 billion Article 77 settlement over Countrywide bonds will take place in May 2013, this next year will be truly one of reckoning for mortgage investors and the U.S. mortgage market as a whole.  Though Her Honor’s proposed timetable may be a bit ambitious, what is clear is that the window of opportunity for investors be made whole for the toxic waste they were sold is finite and rapidly shrinking.

In the case of Countrywide, the end game will depend on the evidence that objecting investors can uncover prior to the approval hearing that might demonstrate that BNYM was conflicted or that its assumptions were unreasonable, both of which would suggest that the settlement number is too low.  For example, the Steering Committee of objecting investors has now sought to intervene in MBIA v. Countrywide to persuade Judge Bransten to remove Countrywide’s confidentiality designations from evidence that MBIA will be presenting to support its summary judgment motions.  Should these documents become public, they would not only encourage Bank of America to settle its 4-year battle with the bond insurer, but they would provide objecting investors in the separate Article 77 action with evidence that might undermine Bank of New York’s assumptions that BofA could ring fence Countrywide.

Meanwhile, the end game scenarios for MBS issuers other than Countrywide will depend on how well investors can get organized over the next six months to a year before the expiration of New York’s six-year statute of limitations on rep and warranty claims.

I have been covering these developments for nearly five years, and blogging about them for four, and I can say with little hesitation that this year will tell us more about the ultimate subprime shakeout than any since the onset of the Mortgage Crisis.  The outcome of BNYM and BofA’s ambitious global settlement as well as investor efforts to file claims before the statutory deadline should lead to a flurry of activity before this time next year, giving us some degree of closure regarding who will bear the losses for the irresponsible lending of 2006 and 2007.  With these developments already starting to unfold, I thought it was high time for my long-promised article on investor end game scenarios.

A Quick Look Back

I launched this blog in July 2008 (link to my first post) in part to help keep readers informed of the latest developments in a market that affects us all in one way or another, and usually in more ways than one.  If you pay taxes, own investments or pay a mortgage in the U.S., you have and continue to be impacted by the fallout from this country’s worst housing crisis since the Great Depression.

But another purpose of this blog was to try to understand what investors were doing about this mess, and if I could, to help push investors towards taking proactive steps to help get this country back on track.  With the government response sorely lacking in cohesiveness and sophistication, only concerted action by investors could restore the integrity of our mortgage market, an essential cog in the economy that was valued at $11 trillion at its peak.

I came at this issue from a background in mortgage insurance litigation, through which I was exposed to shocking truths about how the subprime and Alt-A sausage was made in the years leading up to the crash.  We had been able to obtain favorable results for mortgage insurance clients based on the strength of their contractual representation and warranty claims that held lenders and issuers to concrete underwriting standards.  But I kept asking myself, if mortgage insurers were having success suing and/or forcing settlements over loans that didn’t meet lending guidelines, why weren’t investors doing the same?

Four years later, with only a fraction of potential investor suits having been pursued, I have gained some of the answers to that question, but none are satisfactory.  Yes, investors are conservative by nature, they usually wish to avoid the spotlight, and they are (rightfully) skittish about suing the powerful banks with whom they do business on a regular basis.  The procedural hurdles in their contracts are onerous, the path of litigation is long and costly, and the prize at the end of the road is uncertain and difficult to quantify.

All these things are true, and yet the returns from this type of litigation could be enormous – far exceeding the returns investors could achieve just about anywhere else in the market.  More importantly, I would argue that this type of litigation engenders critical redistribution of wealth from banks to investors, which both deters banks from engaging in shoddy lending and securitization practices, and helps to encourage investors to return and support a private mortgage market in the future.  Still, nobody ever said that doing the right thing and unwinding one of the most complex and extensive Ponzi schemes in history would be easy.

An Unexpected Source of Inspiration

One of the great things about living in Petaluma (other than getting to watch our boys finish third in the Little League World Series this past weekend – so proud!) is that most homes have decent-sized backyards and there’s great weather for gardening.  Each year, I like to grow a few standards – tomatoes and jalapeños for homemade salsa, at a minimum – and a few novelties, just to keep things interesting.  This year, I tried my hand at Japanese eggplant, curly kale, and tomatillos.  I even grew some padron peppers, known as the Russian roulette peppers because every half dozen or so are deadly spicy, which turned out to be a hit in my family.  This year, as in years past, some plants flourished, while others never seemed to catch on.

I was working in my garden this past weekend, getting a healthy reprieve from mortgage crisis litigation, when I stopped to evaluate a couple of potted herbs that had once been strong, but that had for some time been languishing in various states of poor health.  I had tried everything on these – watering them more, watering them less, giving them more sun, giving them less sun, cutting them back, letting them grow – but nothing seemed to work.  The stalks had become ossified, the leaves rust-colored, and there was little growth or production to speak of.

I decided I might try transplanting these sickly specimens, but when I removed the pots from around the root balls, I realized that their roots had withered and died, and these plants were beyond help.

It was only then, when I finally decided to let those plant go, and went out and bought new, vibrant replacement plants, that I realized what a drag the old plants had been on my garden.  Sure, it hadn’t “cost” me anything in the monetary sense to prop these plants up, beyond perhaps the cost of the water I poured into their pots.  But in reality, there were significant non-monetary costs that had to be taken into account.

There were the favored places in the garden that got the most sunlight that the plants had been occupying, there was the time and effort that I put into keeping them alive, there was the emotional drag of seeing the plants failing to recover day after day, and there were the opportunity costs of not having fresh herbs to use because I didn’t want to go out and buy replacements when the old plants in my garden were still technically alive.  Suddenly, a light bulb went off.

My saga with my plants on life support was the perfect metaphor for the societal costs of propping up the “too big to fail” (TBTF) banks and allowing fatally wounded “zombie” banks to continue to suck scarce resources from the economy.  Just as it pained me to give up on plants that had once been productive, the politics surrounding “too big to fail” banks make regulators irrationally averse to allowing nature to run its course and take down sickly financial institutions.  The fear is that the interconnectedness of the market, just like the interconnectedness of a root system, means that allowing a major financial institution to fail will disrupt the entire market. But the alternative brings its own costs that must be taken into account, such as the creation of perverse incentives for anti-competitive and inefficient behavior.

Of course, this wasn’t the first time someone had drawn the analogy between botany and economic health.  I immediately thought of the 1979 movie Being There (based on the book by Jerzy Kosinski), featuring Peter Sellers in a unique role as the simpleton gardener who gets mistaken for a brilliant sage (watch original trailer here).

Knowing nothing about the outside world except what he had seen on TV and learned in his garden, Chance the Gardener wanders out into the world to become known as Chauncey Gardner, whose simple statements about gardening come to influence national economic policy.  I had not seen the movie in many years, so I decided to rent it, and was bowled over by its continued relevance.  Take the following exchange:

Chance the Gardener: In the garden, growth has it seasons. First comes spring and summer, but then we have fall and winter. And then we get spring and summer again.

President “Bobby”: Spring and summer.

Chance the Gardener: Yes.

President “Bobby”: Then fall and winter.

Chance the Gardener: Yes.

Benjamin Rand: I think what our insightful young friend is saying is that we welcome the inevitable seasons of nature, but we’re upset by the seasons of our economy.

This axiom immediately called to mind my economics classes in college, in which the pejorative word “recession” was rarely used when describing down cycles in the market.  Instead, these downturns were referred to as “corrections,” a word with a much more positive connotation.

The idea was that down cycles were necessary and ultimately beneficial parts of the business cycle, as they corrected inefficiencies in the market by exposing and eliminating the weakest players.  This, in turn, cleared the way for new, more efficient players to enter, enabling greater long-term growth.  In other words, to paraphrase Jefferson, the tree of capitalism must be refreshed from time to time by the blood of insolvency.

An Economy on Life Support

Unfortunately, during this recent recession, little has actually been “corrected” in the U.S. market, and it’s a big reason we continue to languish in a tepid economy, bouncing along the bottom.  The continued lethargy in the housing market across most of the country is one of the primary culprits, and this, in turn, can be blamed on a failure to deal effectively with distressed properties and the failure to correct fundamental problems with housing finance that might pave the way for the return of the private market.

Bill Frey and I published Way Too Big to Fail precisely to address and offer solutions for these ongoing problems, but few of these suggestions have been implemented as of this writing (I would note that Redwood Trust, one of the few funds that has been issuing MBS in the last few years, has implemented several reforms in its securities that mirror those discussed in the book, and has demonstrated solid performance as a result).

The truth remains that loan aggregators and sellers have not been forced to pay for the harm they have inflicted on the economy – not in any meaningful sense.  Sure, some of them got caught holding the bag with some of these toxic assets on their own books when the music stopped, and some have settled with certain aggressive investors or insurers, but they have not been held accountable for the bulk of the toxic assets they sold during the Boom Years.

And what did these issuers do that was so wrong?  Weren’t they victimized like the rest of us when the world unexpectedly fell apart?

As I’ve gone into at great length in prior posts, at a minimum, loan aggregators and sellers (i.e. most of this country’s largest banks and investment banks) sold over a trillion dollars’ worth of securities backed by loans that were nowhere near the quality that they represented (let’s use the technical legal term “crappy loans”).  These institutions agreed to repurchase these crappy loans at par should they fail in any material respect to meet extensive warranties regarding their quality and characteristics.

In some cases, major investment banks profited multiple times off of the sale of the same crappy loans: 1) by bargaining down the price they paid for the crappy loans using the results from their own due diligence samples and then selling loans they knew were defective to investors at a profit; 2) by going back to loan sellers and shaking them down for settlements when the crappy loans went bad; and 3) by placing strategic bets against the securities themselves or the industry participants like monoline insurers who would be saddled with the losses from these crappy loans.

This and other irresponsible or outright fraudulent conduct has contributed to the complete collapse of the private mortgage market.  More than 95% of new loans today are backed by our government, and thus by you, the taxpayer.  There is no private market to speak of, save for a few jumbo deals with high-quality collateral, and there will be no serious private market for the foreseeable future.

There is a massive crisis of confidence – and deservedly so – surrounding our largest financial institutions and the rule of law.  Our pension funds, college endowments, and insurance funds have taken the bulk of the losses thus far.  And investors will not return to this market if some measure of loss sharing (I won’t go so far as to call it “justice”) is imposed on the banks that created and sold these crappy loans in the first place.

The federal government, for its part, has responded primarily by bailing out those same banks and “foaming the runway” for a soft landing.  In actuality, the Treasury and the TARP bailout gave the banks such as soft landing that they largely bounced back without experiencing the healing pain of austerity, downsizing or – gasp – failure.

As illustrated in Neil Barofsky’s eye-opening new book, Bailout, this was the result of an intentional policy decision – the decision to inject capital and confidence into the economy by propping up the largest banks.  This path has failed completely to boost the capital available for the middle class, and has succeeded only in postponing the correction and keeping bloated institutions on life support.  Meanwhile, it has created perverse incentives for banks to misrepresent their financial health by manipulating LIBOR and take risky double-or-nothing-style bets to try to earn their way out.  

Again, I am reminded of the scene in Being There where Chance is asked by the President to weigh in on economic policy:

President “Bobby”: Mr. Gardner, do you agree with Ben, or do you think that we can stimulate growth through temporary incentives?

[Long pause]

Chance the Gardener: As long as the roots are not severed, all is well. And all will be well in the garden.

The roots of our biggest financial institutions are withered and rotting, and the costs of keeping them alive are mounting.  And yet, with little appetite in Washington for another federally-funded bailout of Wall Street, and continued strains being placed on bank balance sheets, there is still hope for that much-needed correction to take place.

Tough Love

What will drive a correction in this market?  Given the aversion of government to crack down on the banks with civil or criminal sanctions or redistributive tax and spend policies, the only hope we have is that private litigants will turn to the court system.

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< of t the--costs .sd lBecatior ps/s116e--costs category/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poe-ealth fr.subprime <
< of t the-ealth fr.sd lBecatior ps/s116e-ealth frcategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poe-ealth fr-myet,.subprime <
< of t the-ealth fr myet,.sd lBecatior ps/s116e-ealth fr myet,category/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poeebbof n.subprime <
< of t theebbof n.sd lBecatior ps/s116eebbof ncategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pombia.subprime <
< of t thsten.sd lBecatior ps/s116Mten/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pomb,.subprime <
< of t thMBS.sd lBecatior ps/s116MtS/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pomshaks “crath fr.subprime <
< of t thmshaks “crath fr.sd lBecatior ps/s116mshaks “crath fr/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pomtgage-fraud cao.subprime <
< of t th losses fgud cao.sd lBecatior ps/s116 losses fgud cao/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pomtgage-fo.subprime <
< of t th losses o.sd lBecatior ps/s116 losses o/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pomtet="_bltte c.subprime <
< of t thiep forcitte c.sd lBecatior ps/s116iep forcitte c/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pomtet="_blrom thes.subprime <
< of t thiep forcirom thes.sd lBecatior ps/s116iep forcirom thes/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pomtet="_bl prima.subprime <
< of t thiep forci prima.sd lBecatior ps/s116iep forci prima/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior ponegve .-dqucti.subprime <
< of t thnegve . dqucti.sd lBecatior ps/s116negve . dqucti/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poneil-hethe re.subprime <
< of t th="http://www..sd lBecatior ps/s116="http://www./p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior po.

<->abrl-mb,.subprime <
< of t th.

abrleom/.sd lBecatior ps/s116.

abrleom//p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior po.<, the pa-h of li.subprime <

< of t th.<, the path of li.sd lBecatior ps/s116.<, the path of li/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior po.ranty i.subprime <
< of t th.ranty i.sd lBecatior ps/s116.ranty i/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior por busiifr.subprime <
< of t thr busiifr.sd lBecatior ps/s116r busiifr/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior por plill-o concry.subprime <
< of t thr pers to concry.sd lBecatior ps/s116r pers to concry/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior por pail in .subprime <
< of t thr pail in .sd lBecatior ps/s116r pail in /p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior por sA will bla> to t.subprime <
< of t thR sA will b C> to t.sd lBecatior ps/s116R sA will b C> to t/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior por stributi all"subprime <
< of t thr stributi all"sd lBecatior ps/s116r stributi all/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior por stegory-f n.subprime <
< of t thr stegory-f n.sd lBecatior ps/s116r stegory-f n/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pormb,.subprime <
< of t thRom/.sd lBecatior ps/s116Rom//p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior ponts like m"subprime <
< of t thnts like m"sd lBecatior ps/s116nts like m/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior ponts likezth fr.subprime <
< of t thnts likezth fr.sd lBecatior ps/s116nts likezth fr/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior posen thalill-strib so.subprime <
< of t thsen thahat pririb so.sd lBecatior ps/s116ntn thahat pririb so/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poseaims beft.subprime <
< of t thseaims beft.sd lBecatior ps/s116nteout.com/category/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior posstatute.subprime <
< of t thsstatute.sd lBecatior ps/s116nstatutecategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior posstal sampl-ory-succ.subprime <
< of t thsstal sampl ory-succ.sd lBecatior ps/s116nstal sampl ory-succcategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior posstautsscatelimiath frt.subprime <
< of t thsstautssl it imiath frt.sd lBecatior ps/s116nstautssl it imiath frtcategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior posans thco-loati all"subprime <
< of t thsans thco loati all"sd lBecatior ps/s116nans thco loati allcategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior posamm-fr-me publi"subprime <
< of t thsamm-fr me publi"sd lBecatior ps/s116namm-fr me publicategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poem>< of t thneroSing" ta Sget="_b"sd lBecatior ps/s116neroSing" ta Sget="_bcategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poeoo-bigfrey">it.subprime <
< of t thof obighould>it.sd lBecatior ps/s116of obighould>itcategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poeoxis apd wh.subprime <
< of t thofxis apd wh.sd lBecatior ps/s116ofxis apd whcategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poemy, uut.subprime <
< of t thTmy, uut.sd lBecatior ps/s116nmy, uutcategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poemf="htt.subprime <
< of t thTmf="htt.sd lBecatior ps/s116nmf="httn tegory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poelf, ylikeiz-gue?

<.subprime <
< of t thelf, ylikeizahue?

<.sd lBecatior ps/s116elf, ylikeizahue?

prior poelf, ylikeiz-p helyc2m.subprime <
< of t thelf, ylikeizap helyc2m.sd lBecatior ps/s116elf, ylikeizap helyc2mn tegory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poesn cat.subprime <
< of t thUS Bcat.sd lBecatior ps/s116US Bcatn tegory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior povampr

-loati all"subprime <
< of t thvampr

loati all"sd lBecatior ps/s116vampr

loati alln tegory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior powai-du-atet.com/ ategu .subprime <
< of t thwai-duese n.com//emigu .sd lBecatior ps/s116wai-duese n.com//emigu n tegory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior powag-tob"subprime <
< of t thWdiv>St..sd lBecatior ps/s116Wdiv>St.n tegory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior powag-wells-fa"subprime <
< of t thWdi-we Plage.sd lBecatior ps/s116Wdi-we Plagen tegory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior powaafreo-bigfrey">it.subprime <
< of t thWay Tf oBighoulF>it.sd lBecatior ps/s116Way Tf oBighoulF>itn tegory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pows="entry-t.subprime <
< of t thWtrys Fry-t.sd lBecatior ps/s116Wtrys Fry-ts (prior powin igm-frel"subprime <
< of t thWin igm Frel"sd lBecatior ps/s116Win igm Frels (< s | s Is NothWtrys that mGgest " tspanitle="Bedsq- heaic.sd lBe1165 ads/2012/08/being_there_presiden?p=1165">2 Com.coms, al gspan> s
s s s it:oHl Gcor crimi & P

it-Safe/Mep forciSstitu,y:, al gdiv> <->abrl-mb,etitior p-.ranty ietitior p-r plill-o concryetitior p-r pail in atitior p-rmb,etitior p-nts likezth fretitior p-ntaims beft titior p-nans thco-loati all titior p-namm-fr-me publi"> s olosses f2> s 300" omo ory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank"pg" al7/rtgage-fr , al byorspanitle="Beautror vcinh" tentle="Beurl fn n/ambac-drops-bombshell-proposed-amended-autror/igradmai.subprime <
< of t morgradmai.>rgradmai, al gspan>
s

Lin ige c,ad ComplainFedateghentialRefntss oulN col Mep forciPranty pC unde, Pt to gWren posLeninslRepail in aLoati all"sirresponsible-lending" target="_blank"pg" al7/fedateg-je perrefntssfreya col -mtet="_blrranty rd to arpa to -waaffco-lenins-r pail in -loati allrofitedI wrotumomic paits sg about thems (< pe pl"heated&amn icom/he-ealth fr tunity iet,lheir riland.com/osome m these/p>cisioenly 27 ual regarerbcategoiff of iterconneal iyc2m firm O/p> Msavthe pely rm “crass invl thsten/p>unnel

I launched tholosses f2> Song>opot rnhinvgtine B,tSyncora lossremove Coun j of tuichtddead Cirresponsible-lenlexologylank"lib hng/detuil.aspx?g=ecb19062-2e77-405b-af8b-178a649af55916nteout.comkt aorom thietn Thstatutescom/he-ealth frcom/sitesand conictisonher pely Syncora ess c mceerom cashdnomdelikt a$375nmsnds wiotax stlayehdingey havese eassrrreer-ed.sstietor arpluseidetyeitesand conts like mchange/p>St.ost thehange:demmystraetyese plheylasis.( sparotiin i5 billioAd insu)ooo avroginnutesntshat theese planolaosome m thes/p>Ifrecultentsdreea r capitalce in May ,t thminjunch fro no sd ComplainTopoFeromRy, boyese plom/hLlines s Ang J of Boginnute/ambac-drops-bombshell-proposed-amended-compla5/>op-f .-my, bos-we- a/wniuncengem>< in gateem>< ca-elines srofited inv/p>ioncyrremove Coun e-liquiditye ehitaxit and selleim bolssecu mg. And-ts thv t bilmimovere sadestcing oblems,aromxit thin Thstatutes>ions nictisr ely tut thie sadese foronI/p> onemb con issuoot baiplwet, a prnoup heylasis.ntse of naupo cahese 75-80 centter redisthat wl it “eurintuitie m thes, rae in tha redis25-30 centtehey adwmarkbumom-futounomy thseaims bef and selOf Lolyst object/p> in estors asened the n his>op-f .-my, bos-we- a/wniuncengem>< in gateem>< ca-elines srofitedmyn-prTh stine Bar redisAwag f uaoncry claims befcom/ (temyitueNo. 4),out eidett se plenappy lo inv/p>ef cnity i in mic p55%nt aAGO/p>secms=%40ReusecuTopicCodes+CONTAINS+%27ANV%27edmantishrey>Ifrecultentse sn /p> by exp ill enly srtutesntsry/irresponsible-lenpr-bonwiretgage-bon-Wayeitss/syncora-guaoncresay3) bys-s s-mimove Coun-e-ealth fr-162799626rofitedSyncora/p>-liquidityoot baip/p>Ifrecultents, sems,se mexfctr s,porh fr taonwes cby exp me atrdin thinnd cotmyse?Ad ninueCom major, ale for ap/p> ine foPlus,ntwaear) by placnity nuenes fand coom/hnmf="swidenal nicti it, forelines monetart tys icltionedtn TV andlifenciehrbes. sctatitn tegonnd cotmm.com run i a/wwry/irresponsiblerere irongcesr-mhtocnbloggntlank"pg" al7/19/ve siz-to-g cipd c-wredeem>chty thatart ty/p>Tup)e forosumssuersinvisean t, boom-futorsaattem> oneutnll hest yeoxp me atrdin thinnd cotmyse?27 uentter redisthat wl itopmentcom/tof us: iSonwredidohaersinvdt hsnnd coiogage-foor anti-costen,vdwmark mceerom thseaims bef?out gomynopini a,pSyncora/p>I was wSyncora opmenedd pe a/wwfthe nrderoxsaattant75%nt a andloaeeiite ad tuv innbtuich raet ht hila ihave gaiandoi> innme publisinssthat wl itopmente"heatedanoleranty pt to a googo n gai,odripendi gaims befeme ats oi> ine foT l factese plomIAehrsnBeld lanteuppy loaromxite s remove CouneI remaud cao>I we t, wSyncora planteuppy lo5mxit14,anotldestcing ry/irresponsiblerere irongcesr-mhtocnbloggntlank"pg" al7/19/ve siz-to-g cipd c-wredeem>sten/p>caraphd , awith BeminlA will b do youIeturnll edtrm/)oaromfactsese plomIAehrsnunnity nue thsa costsse eassrown c ws and selleim talheir rilandtegee growr stectsntsMten/p>ss cuably t stablishdye pl invl"heated&Bar redishn Juo bhCemove Coun/p>ss cbecdieaskzed thaColy t.comtecmnsiifr/p> hould s m morse llifnssuersavolA will balllr steiud caoe wicey havedocu.coms tuneersdt th Iary-dutes foten/p>irantwes cg abouted. capitalt to lhrsnry/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank"pg"0la6/br-maand-mimove Coun-rdedal-aprim-alloemum-mbia-vampr

-loati allrd to -to-reot abrofited y-versdt, morse lntsdismnsicom/ (te nrdeeaomxit taisg cisern)iotax d Complainsten Cayebraetyeity desi D cisernmrnmLoms,Centth fr; gondtegory wSb wenLeoack o.comGue?assu"sirresponsible-lending" target="_blank"pg" al1ombia-cayebraety-bty desi-g cisern- wae to-mentth fr- ondtegoryarstig-theoack ffco-hue?assurofitedmorse l.comthr gair amm-fr me publise ll to cantth fr, ale foSheatedanng t to lans.ans thful,ssten teated mceeromnamurnsenr ps y caeu postponfull an coneite aonn ttt thminnech fro no se m teiza thaColove CouneI f="swgl nicti (iden ied.nts,tyIbtuich raet t a andelf, lyto gl-y d) plusepu n cyclgy caeu se eprworarvateginss cbumom-futouet le invl tyo,atmant t wgeri gaims befeinssthat wl itopmentese entwaeplesSyncoraatuneersdt(twaea onelng><>op-5-rmb,-titss-to-watch-abn-v-dout aorofitededisAtine Ba78mg cisernmsetue h thant fagol n parti invcom/ (te n>ss cbumodeeaosd,nr

Ilhe1), lossoxp elng>f="ho we wbyhitaxanoleranty paud ca dufutououtack.allld teiza thalasplarvategimestht,ssten >ss ch thantfee cby ex dghtite aonorom thele-duorcsw snni 2re wte>ant alkhseaims bef and selry srtutesntsMten/p> innse entwaeo file claims befsaSyncora lossAGOm-tegy p no s5invatt bageroouoten/p> innpepuentagerdinnass “eur"heatedit reot ab go n gainln partimimovere sadesth theBinve foTitie m the teated mcity cnamurnsenr ps y caeu aro100% it “eurifaiplwieeiitstopmente pospte ceianrescithcops y caeu, lossgy caeu ientwaety gerdin75%nt a “eurifaip/p>tioshdingitss lbtanvdted rb ldepedtrediarotiin i80% itoten/p> in estors arothtoosses fwnackIfrecultentstorsaatt sisevesopwled factun iing aroplaymonetaryttef cing cey havepoinf t the-ealth fr trediI-secm &ith Beinflech fropoinf do youI/p>haraprdinadty s

ions g about theme foTitiilcrath fre neoten/p>ss cgoxn TV loat imbIeturnayhatediomIA/p>ss cbecdifew en t.comuich losses fgud ca ieer tucce nicitie dk.aduegivircumhstactyoot bawe plhey aorom a/ww thmimmca inlte plhey aoroming ty y h thant fanteoutVth of cg gaimoneGiian hisory-ot rviom-fudeftnsestcing asis. a/wwaf g loan Iaposl enltaxanole sades in y ca beeevs assumkw plwss cm sadedVth of ca factfnzie e"heateda gaintnsus,pIedog/p> s s 300" omi ory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poallod rse tegor to"subprime <

< of t thallod rse nt a “"sd lBecatior ps/s116allod rse nt a “s (prior post th"subprime <
< of t thst th"sd lBecatior ps/s116st ths (prior posofa.subprime <
< of t th inv"sd lBecatior ps/s116 invcom/em8/investor-end-games-all-is-not-well-in-t>prior pomint hel-t.com/.subprime <
< of t thmint hel t.com/.sd lBecatior ps/s116mint hel t.com/com/em8/investor-end-games-all-is-not-well-in-t>prior pomimove Coun.subprime <
< of t thCimove Coun.sd lBecatior ps/s116Cimove Countrm/em8/investor-end-games-all-is-not-well-in-t>prior po y caeu.subprime <
< of t th y caeu.sd lBecatior ps/s116 y caeutrm/em8/investor-end-games-all-is-not-well-in-t>prior poerc.subprime <
< of t therc.sd lBecatior ps/s116erccom/em8/investor-end-games-all-is-not-well-in-t>prior potte c.subprime <
< of t thtte c.sd lBecatior ps/s116tte ccom/em8/investor-end-games-all-is-not-well-in-t>prior poo file-s3) by pla.subprime <
< of t tho file claims bef.sd lBecatior ps/s116o file claims befcom/em8/investor-end-games-all-is-not-well-in-t>prior posts, at a minimum, lbprime <
< of t thn contributed minimum, d lBecatior ps/s116n contributed minimumcategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pompmom/20, lbprime <
< of t thePMom/20, d lBecatior ps/s116ePMom/20category/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pome pereileen-bty desi, lbprime <
< of t thentialEileenlity desi, d lBecatior ps/s116entialEileenlity desicategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pome perpaul-crotty, lbprime <
< of t thentialPaultCrotty, d lBecatior ps/s116entialPaultCrottycategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pome ected-opini as, lbprime <
< of t thentected Opini as, d lBecatior ps/s116entected Opini ascategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pomenico-lot s, lbprime <
< of t thmenico lot s, d lBecatior ps/s116menico lot scategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poje p-truals, lbprime <
< of t thme ps/ruals, d lBecatior ps/s116me ps/rualscategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poelines s, lbprime <
< of t thelines s, d lBecatior ps/s116elines scategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poeeninso.subprime <
< of t theeninso.sd lBecatior ps/s116eeninsocategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poe-liquidity.subprime <
< of t the-liquidity.sd lBecatior ps/s116e-liquiditycategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poe-ealth fr.subprime <
< of t the-ealth fr.sd lBecatior ps/s116e-ealth frcategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poe-ealth fr-myet,.subprime <
< of t the-ealth fr myet,.sd lBecatior ps/s116e-ealth fr myet,category/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poeeto-mentth fr.subprime <
< of t theeto cantth fr.sd lBecatior ps/s116eeto cantth fr, algory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poeeto-torsaatty.subprime <
< of t theeto torsaatty.sd lBecatior ps/s116eeto torsaattycategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pombia.subprime <
< of t thsten.sd lBecatior ps/s116Mten/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pomb,.subprime <
< of t thMBS.sd lBecatior ps/s116MtS/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pomshaks “crath fr.subprime <
< of t thmshaks “crath fr.sd lBecatior ps/s116mshaks “crath fr/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pomtgage-fraud cao.subprime <
< of t th losses fgud cao.sd lBecatior ps/s116 losses fgud cao/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pomtgage-fo.subprime <
< of t th losses o.sd lBecatior ps/s116 losses o/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pomtet="_blrom thes.subprime <
< of t thiep forcirom thes.sd lBecatior ps/s116iep forcirom thes/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poome innp-myhes.subprime <
< of t thO'lMe innp > Msavt.sd lBecatior ps/s116O'Me innp > Msavt/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior po.

<->abrl-mb,.subprime <
< of t th.

abrleom/.sd lBecatior ps/s116.

abrleom//p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior po.ranty i.subprime <

< of t th.ranty i.sd lBecatior ps/s116.ranty i/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior por plill-o concry.subprime <
< of t thr pers to concry.sd lBecatior ps/s116r pers to concry/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior por pail in .subprime <
< of t thr pail in .sd lBecatior ps/s116r pail in /p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior pormb,.subprime <
< of t thRom/.sd lBecatior ps/s116Rom//p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior ponts likezth fr.subprime <
< of t thnts likezth fr.sd lBecatior ps/s116nts likezth fr/p> gory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior poseaims beft.subprime <
< of t thseaims beft.sd lBecatior ps/s116nteout.com/category/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior posans thco-loati all"subprime <
< of t thsans thco loati all"sd lBecatior ps/s116nans thco loati allcategory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank">prior posamm-fr-me publi"subprime <
< of t thsamm-fr me publi"sd lBecatior ps/s116namm-fr me publica(< s | s 6 Com.coms, al gspan> s
s s sit:oHl Gcor crimi & P

it-Safe/Mep forciSstitu,y:, al gdiv> syndid reptitior p-snhtml" sntitior p-je pereileen-bty desintitior p-je perpaul-crottyntitior p-je ected-opini asntitior p-elines s titior p-eeninso titior p-e-liquidityetitior p-e-ealth fr mitior p-e to-mentth fr mitior p-e to-torsaattyetitior p-mbiaetitior p-mbyetitior p-mtgage-fraud caoetitior p-mtgage-foetitior p-poolto - ulatdelinetitior p-p

<->abrl-mb,etitior p-.rblid-pepuepd caoetitior p-.ranty ietitior p-r plill-o concryetitior p-r pail in atitior p-rescith fr mitior p-contributi all titior p-rmb,etitior p-nts likezth fretitior p-ntaims beft titior p-nig cety-egorimiath frsetitior p-ning" ta titior p-nimm-fr-me publi titior p-elf, ylikeiz-gue?

< titior p-elf, ylikeiz-p helyc2ms/s1-o file-mitathispm> s FedateghentialRefntss oulN col Mep forciPranty pC unde, Pt to gWren posLeninslRepail in aLoati all, al gh2> s 300" omo ory/irresponsible-lending" target="_blank"pg" al7/fedateg-je perrefntssfreya col -mtet="_blrranty rd to arpa to -waaffco-lenins-r pail in -loati allrofite ubprime3:59 am/id lBe& pri">, al byorspanitle="Beautror vcinh" tentle="Beurl fn n/ambac-drops-bombshell-proposed-amended-autror/igradmai.subprime <
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seabbrsubprimelast chanrc" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_tlviewtoggri_13.>s abbrnLoai be... s nliitle="Befeedreai be_bn Jmpri" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_bn Jmpri_18.6t" ti/uploads/2012/08googlesidens2/favrccao?goma t=blogs.wsjside1itle="Bercca16px" >sdthme16/amre no="16" longIcca1ied teniid="s bele-3_feedreai be_y chor_18. t/uploads/201blogs.wsjside/eli"subprimeWSJside: Lli oog - WSJside. d lBeextern l 1itle="Befeedreai be_y chor ">WSJside: Lli oog - WSJsides an sepitle="Befrbl_last_< ofubpri" tent/uplo#" id="s bele-3_frbl_last_< ofubpri_18. >s an

seabbrsubprimelast chanrc" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_tlviewtoggri_18.>s abbrnLoai be... s nliitle="Befeedreai be_bn Jmpri" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_bn Jmpri_17.6t" ti/uploads/2012/08googlesidens2/favrccao?goma t=volokhside1itle="Bercca16px" >sdthme16/amre no="16" longIcca1ied teniid="s bele-3_feedreai be_y chor_17. t/uploads/201volokhside/"subprimeTitiVolokh Conspi hel. d lBeextern l 1itle="Befeedreai be_y chor ">TitiVolokh Conspi hels an sepitle="Befrbl_last_< ofubpri" tent/uplo#" id="s bele-3_frbl_last_< ofubpri_17. >s an

seabbrsubprimelast chanrc" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_tlviewtoggri_17.>s abbrnLoai be... s nliitle="Befeedreai be_bn Jmpri" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_bn Jmpri_2216t" ti/uploads/2012/08googlesidens2/favrccao?goma t=2/08dandodtefrside1itle="Bercca16px" >sdthme16/amre no="16" longIcca1ied teniid="s bele-3_feedreai be_y chor_221 t/uploads/2012/08dandodtefrside/"subprimeTitiD>O Dtefr. d lBeextern l 1itle="Befeedreai be_y chor ">TitiD>O Dtefrs an sepitle="Befrbl_last_< ofubpri" tent/uplo#" id="s bele-3_frbl_last_< ofubpri_221 >s an

seabbrsubprimelast chanrc" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_tlviewtoggri_2216t abbrn s nliitle="Befeedreai be_bn Jmpri" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_bn Jmpri_1916t" ti/uploads/2012/08googlesidens2/favrccao?goma t=2/08likholtzside1itle="Bercca16px" >sdthme16/amre no="16" longIcca1ied teniid="s bele-3_feedreai be_y chor_191 t/uploads/2012/08likholtzside1blog/"subprimeTitiBigiPior th. u wgeong_blank" d lBeextern l gostact1itle="Befeedreai be_y chor ">TitiBigiPior ths an sepitle="Befrbl_last_< ofubpri" tent/uplo#" id="s bele-3_frbl_last_< ofubpri_191 u wgeong_blank" >s an

seabbrsubprimelast chanrc" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_tlviewtoggri_19.>s abbrn s nliitle="Befeedreai be_bn Jmpri" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_bn Jmpri_1516t" ti/uploads/2012/08googlesidens2/favrccao?goma t=2/08beckec-< onec-blogside1itle="Bercca16px" >sdthme16/amre no="16" longIcca1ied teniid="s bele-3_feedreai be_y chor_151 t/uploads/2012/08beckec-< onec-blogside/"subprimeTitiBeckec-Posner oog. d lBeextern l 1itle="Befeedreai be_y chor ">TitiBeckec-Posner oogs an sepitle="Befrbl_last_< ofubpri" tent/uplo#" id="s bele-3_frbl_last_< ofubpri_15. >s an

seabbrsubprimelast chanrc" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_tlviewtoggri_15.>s abbrn s nliitle="Befeedreai be_bn Jmpri" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_bn Jmpri_14.6t" ti/uploads/2012/08googlesidens2/favrccao?goma t=bas

sdthme16/amre no="16" longIcca1ied teniid="s bele-3_feedreai be_y chor_14. t/uploads/201bas

ScenarTitiBas

Scenar sepitle="Befrbl_last_< ofubpri" tent/uplo#" id="s bele-3_frbl_last_< ofubpri_14. >s an

seabbrsubprimelast chanrc" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_tlviewtoggri_14.>s abbrn s nliitle="Befeedreai be_bn Jmpri" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_bn Jmpri_10.6t" ti/uploads/2012/08googlesidens2/favrccao?goma t=blogs.reutersside1itle="Bercca16px" >sdthme16/amre no="16" longIcca1ied teniid="s bele-3_feedreai be_y chor_10. t/uploads/201blogs.reutersside/alison-ptenkel/"subprimeOnt thiCas<. d lBeextern l 1itle="Befeedreai be_y chor ">Ont thiCas sepitle="Befrbl_last_< ofubpri" tent/uplo#" id="s bele-3_frbl_last_< ofubpri_10. >s an

seabbrsubprimelast chanrc" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_tlviewtoggri_10.>s abbrnLoai be... s nliitle="Befeedreai be_bn Jmpri" id="s bele-3_feedreai be_bn Jmpri_2116t" ti/uploads/2012/08googlesidens2/favrccao?goma t=2/08nakedcapitelismside1itle="Bercca16px" >sdthme16/amre no="16" longIcca1ied teniid="s bele-3_feedreai be_y chor_211 t/uploads/2012/08nakedcapitelismside/"subprimeNakedhCapitelism. d lBeextern l 1itle="Befeedreai be_y chor ">NakedhCapitelisms an sepitle="Befrbl_last_< ofubpri" tent/uplo#" id="s bele-3_frbl_last_< ofubpri_211 >s an

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